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Introduction
This thesis is divided into three chapters. The first two chapters investigate the empiri-
cal relevance of two distinct shareholder-debtholder conflicts, strategic default and asset
substitution. Chapter 1 and 2 are related in that they are both concerned with capital
structure-induced agency conflicts. The third chapter is dedicated to a different area of
corporate finance, that of executive compensation and corporate governance.
Chapter 1 investigates the idea that concerns about strategic behavior of borrowers are
reflected in corporate debt structure. An important insight of the incomplete contracts
approach to corporate finance is that borrowers can have incentives to act opportunisti-
cally once debt is in place, trying to extract concessions from lenders even when cash flows
are sufficiently high to service debt in full. A deliberate failure to perform the contractu-
ally stipulated debt service has been termed strategic default. In principle, this type of
incentive problem exists whenever creditors can expect to suffer significant losses in case
the borrowing firm is liquidated and if, in addition, debt can be renegotiated. In such a
situation, lenders may agree to grant concessions on the terms of the loan, rather than risk
to incur even bigger losses in liquidation. Rational lenders should anticipate such strategic
behavior and limit the amount of debt they are willing to grant. Thus, such misalignment
of incentives is costly, because it can reduce debt capacity and firm value.
By choosing a type of debt which is difficult or impossible to renegotiate, these costs
can possibly be reduced. Issuing public debt is an effective way of introducing such rene-
gotiation frictions. Due to coordination problems among its highly dispersed claimants,
public debt is essentially renegotiation-proof. Hence, firms facing particularly severe incen-
tive problems may use public debt as a commitment device allowing them to increase debt
capacity. However, issuing renegotiation-proof debt comes at a cost. In cases of liquidity
default, when cash flows are insufficient to service debt obligations, renegotiation flexibility
is valuable as it makes reorganization more viable and thus increases the chances of avoid-
ing inefficient liquidation. Moreover, renegotiation flexibility is particularly valuable for
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firms facing high liquidation costs, so precisely for those firms with the strongest incentives
for strategic default. Thus, whether liquidation costs lead firms to rely more or less on
public debt is an empirical question.
Answering this question is the task of Chapter 1. The evidence suggests that strategic
considerations do not have a first order effect on the choice of public versus private debt.
If anything, firms with asset structures that imply high liquidation costs tend to rely less,
not more, on public debt. These findings suggest that ex-post efficiency (in terms of rene-
gotiation flexibility) may be more important than ex-ante efficiency (in terms of incentive
alignment) for corporate choice of creditor concentration. However, other interpretations
are also conceivable. The lack of statistical robustness across regression specifications may
indicate that the two effects largely offset each other. Yet another interpretation is that
strategic default incentives may be addressed by mechanisms other than creditor dispersion.
Chapter 2 examines a classical agency conflict, the asset substitution problem, in a new
light. The term asset substitution refers to the notion that leverage induces shareholders
to increase asset risk at the expense of debtholders, by substituting less risky assets with
more risky ones. The intuition of this hypothesis is founded on the analogy between a
levered firm’s equity and a financial call option, which generally increases in the riskiness
of the underlying asset.
An important distinction between the approach taken in the present work and most of
the existing literature, is that the hypothesis is tested directly, that is, the direct relation
between asset risk and leverage is examined. Prior research has largely studied whether
risk-shifting concerns are reflected in capital structure, thus providing only indirect evi-
dence. The direct approach, however, poses two main challenges to the analysis. First,
asset volatility needs to be accurately estimated. This is non-trivial as asset risk is in gen-
eral unobserved. This issue is addressed by estimating asset risk as the volatility implied
by structural credit risk models. A second concern is that the leverage-risk relation is sub-
ject to endogeneity. To alleviate endogeneity problems the analysis employs instrumental
variables methods which exploit exogenous sources of variation in leverage.
The evidence indicates that a positive, causal relation between leverage and asset
volatility exists. However, this relation is statistically and economically significant only
for long-term leverage, that is when leverage is defined as the ratio of long-term debt
to total assets or market value. Consistent with theoretical predictions about the role
of debt maturity for risk-shifting incentives, this implies that long-term debt aggravates
while short-term debt curbs risk-shifting incentives. Further results show that risk-taking
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incentives provided to management through incentive compensation as well as the ability
to shift operational risks, as determined by the nature of the assets, are important factors
exacerbating the asset substitution problem.
A main insight of this study is that the causal effect of leverage on firm risk (as iden-
tified by instrumental variables regressions) is positive even though the partial correlation
between leverage and risk (as obtained from reduced form regressions) is negative. This
suggests that asset risk generally decreases as firms take on higher levels of debt, but that
this decrease is not as strong as it would be without the incentive effect of leverage. A
practical implication of this finding is that creditors should anticipate the incentive effect of
granting loans to their borrowers. Therefore, an interesting question left for future research
is whether this incentive effect is priced in corporate bonds and loans.
Finally, chapter 3 proposes and analyzes a causal connection between executive com-
pensation and forced CEO turnover. Executive compensation has increased dramatically
over the past 15 years, but so has forced turnover. The close parallel development, not
only regarding the general long-term evolution, but also the non-monotonic pattern after
2000, suggests that the two trends may be linked. Previous research shows that fired CEOs
often suffer severe reductions of earnings opportunities later in their professional lives, and
sometimes forfeit their previous compensation. I argue that these adverse consequences of
forced turnover explain part of the secular rise and cross-sectional variation of CEO pay.
Two models are developed which each account for one of the two channels affecting
the value of executive pay. Estimates obtained from these models indicate that monetary
consequences of turnover can account for a 2 to 4 percent increase in total compensation
for a one percentage point increase in turnover risk.
The empirical analysis reveals an even larger premium. For the CEOs of the largest
US corporations for the years 1993-2001, a one-percentage point increase in the probability
of involuntary turnover is associated with about 10 percent more in terms of total com-
pensation. It is shown that this relation is unlikely to be driven by reverse causation or a
general tendency towards stronger performance sensitivity of both pay and turnover. One
interpretation of the divergence between the monetary costs of turnover and the empirical
turnover risk premium is that non-monetary costs of forced turnover require additional risk
premia. Another possible explanation draws on evidence from behavioral economics. Even
though the historical average probability of forced turnover is small, CEOs may overesti-
mate these probabilities as they represent an extreme event. Thus, probability weighting
as proposed in cumulative prospect theory may lead executives to perceive turnover risk
4 INTRODUCTION
as much higher than it actually is, hence overstating the expected losses. Disentangling
the various sources of the empirical premium for turnover risk is an interesting avenue for
future research.
The proposed mechanisms and the empirical evidence on the executive turnover risk
premium provide a new, powerful argument in the debate over the development of executive
compensation. While much of the recent discussion in this area has been centered on the
view that rising CEO pay is due to weak boards and managerial entrenchment, I propose
a contrarian perspective, namely that it is precisely strong, assertive boards that lead to
high pay, because CEOs need to be compensated for increased firing risk.
Chapter 1
Does Public Debt have Strategic
Value? An Empirical Analysis
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1.1 Introduction
This paper investigates the idea that concerns about strategic behavior of borrowers are
reflected in corporate debt structure. An important insight of the incomplete contracts
approach to corporate finance is that borrowers can have incentives to act opportunis-
tically once debt is in place, trying to extract concessions from lenders even when cash
flows are sufficiently high to service debt in full. In principle, this type of incentive prob-
lem exists whenever creditors can expect to suffer significant losses in case of liquidation.
Because such strategic behavior requires renegotiation, renegotiation-proof debt may be
used in order to align incentives and thus allow for higher debt capacity and firm value.
Creditor dispersion is one way to create renegotiation frictions and, in the limit, preclude
renegotiation altogether. Thus liquidation costs should be related to the degree of creditor
dispersion. Of course, introducing renegotiation frictions improves ex-ante efficiency at
the cost of ex-post efficiency. So ultimately, depending of which effect dominates, creditor
dispersion may be positively or negatively associated with liquidation costs. This study
takes firms’ use of public debt as a measure of creditor dispersion and explores whether it
can be explained by concerns over strategic behavior.
The results indicate that strategic considerations do not seem to have a first order
effect on the choice between public and private debt. Even though statistical significance
is in general weak and not robust across regression specifications, it appears that ex-post
efficiency (in terms of renegotiation flexibility) is more important than ex-ante efficiency (in
terms of incentive alignment) for the optimal degree of creditor dispersion. The proxies for
liquidation costs have a sign opposite to that predicted by strategic default concerns in most
of the regressions, and they consistently have the opposite sign when they are statistically
significant. The lack of robustness of the results can be interpreted as indicating that the
two effects approximately offset each other.
The incomplete contracts approach to capital structure pioneered by Aghion and Bolton
(1992) and Hart and Moore (1994, 1998) has emphasized the difference between liquidity
default, where the firm’s cash flows are insufficient to honor the debt contract, and strategic
default, where borrowers choose to default even when cash flows are sufficiently high.
Incentives for borrowers to behave opportunistically are present whenever they can hope
to extract concessions from creditors, such as a reduction of debt service or forgiveness of
parts of the debt. In general, concessions are likely in situations when the creditor would be
hurt more by enforcing the debt contract than by making such concessions. Anderson and
Sundaresan (1996), Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997) and Fan and Sundaresan (2000)
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analyze the effects of strategic behavior in the single-creditor case, a general prediction
being that higher liquidation costs lead to lower debt capacities because lenders anticipate
their weak bargaining position in a strategic renegotiation and hence limit the amount
of funds they provide to the verifiable firm value, i.e. the liquidation value. If there are
advantages to debt, such as a favorable tax treatment, lower debt capacity reduces firm
value.
Given that a creditor’s bargaining power in strategic renegotiations reduces debt capac-
ity and firm value, value-maximizing firms should seek to limit their bargaining power ex
ante, if such commitment is feasible. Bergman and Callen (1991), Bolton and Scharfstein
(1996) and Hege and Mella-Barral (2005) argue that dispersed debt reduces the creditor’s
bargaining power in renegotiations because, due to coordination problems, this type of
debt is more difficult to renegotiate or even renegotiation-proof. Hence, firms with high
liquidation costs are hypothesized to rely more heavily on public, dispersed debt relative
to private, concentrated debt.
Using a related argument Berglo¨f and von Thadden (1994) show that a complex cap-
ital structure with multiple classes of investors who hold claims that differ in maturity
and seniority is more difficult to renegotiate than a simple capital structure with a sin-
gle investor because externalities across the different classes of investors make the senior,
short-term claim holders tougher in renegotiations. Hence, firms with high liquidation
costs are predicted to have larger proportions of senior and short-term debt. In a related
theoretical setting, Diamond (2004) derives similar predictions, namely that enforcement
costs are positively associated with the proportion of short-term debt, the degree of ex-
ternalities between lenders, and the optimal number of creditors. The common theme of
the different theoretical approaches is that ex-post inefficiencies due to dispersed investors
with conflicting interests increases ex-ante efficiency by discouraging strategic default.
While incomplete contracts models stress ex-ante efficiency of creditor dispersion, other
authors view ex-post efficiency as more important. Bris and Welch (2005) argue that
mutual free-riding incentives weaken the overall outcome of dispersed claimants, because
they reduce collection or reorganization effort in default. Applied to the present setting
this would imply that concentrated debt is preferable when liquidation costs are potentially
high, a prediction opposite to that emerging from the incomplete contracts view. This is,
indeed, one interpretation of the empirical results.
A large body of empirical literature analyzes the effects of conflicts among lenders
from an ex-post perspective. Most of this literature focuses on distressed reorganizations
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under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.1 Franks and Torous (1989), Gilson et al. (1990), Franks
and Torous (1994) and Helwege (1999) document that formal bankruptcy under Chapter
11 is lengthier and more costly than informal reorganization. Gilson et al. (1990) and
Asquith et al. (1994) find that the probability of a successful out-of-court reorganization
increases with a smaller number of debt contracts, larger proportions of bank debt, and
lower proportions of secured debt. In addition, Betker (1995) shows that deviations from
absolute priority, which also indicate negotiation flexibility, are larger when the fraction
of secured or senior debt is lower. Although some studies have found conflicting results2,
taken together, the evidence seems to support the assumption of the cited theoretical
models that a larger degree of creditor dispersion and the presence of various types of debt
indeed complicate renegotiation.
In contrast, empirical evidence on the ex-ante perspective, i.e. the relation between the
expected relative bargaining position and the choice of financial structure, is limited to the
analysis of bank debt.3 Detragiache et al. (2000), Ongena and Smith (2000) and Esty and
Megginson (2004) provide cross-country evidence on the influence of creditor protection
and the number of banking relationships. Davydenko and Franks (2004) study the relation
between creditor rights and the degree and type of bank loan collateralization. Benmelech
et al. (2004) investigate the link between liquidation values of commercial properties and
characteristics of mortgage loans. In general, these papers find evidence consistent with
bargaining-based theories, namely that firms which are likely to be in a strong bargaining
position in renegotiations tend to have a larger number of bank relationships and more
secured bank debt. Extending the evidence on the ex-ante perspective to the choice between
public and private debt is the task of this paper.
Another contribution of this paper is the precision of the debt structure variables. I use
a sample of 200 U.S. corporations for which I construct a unique, hand-collected data set
on debt structure for fiscal year 2003. I use Mergent/Moody’s database on corporate debt
issues in combination with annual reports to determine, for each debt issue, whether it is
private or public. The Mergent/Moody’s database is very precise in this regard since it
1For evidence on bank debt restructuring in Germany see Brunner and Krahnen (2002)
2Franks and Torous (1994) do not find a significant relation between absolute priority deviations and
the proportion of private debt or the number of debt issues. In a sample of junk bond issuers; Helwege
(1999) even finds that higher fractions of bank debt increase reorganization time while the fraction of junk
bonds shortens the period spent in default.
3In a related paper Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007) study whether variables that proxy for strategic
actions are reflected in corporate credit spreads. As a measure for renegotiation frictions they also use,
among other variables, the ratio of public to total debt. In their empirical specification they use the public
debt ratio as an exogenous variable but mention that it may be endogenously determined.
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records, for each debt issue, whether it has been publicly or privately placed, and whether
privately placed issues have been registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) subsequent to placement. Most prior studies on public versus private debt choice
(Houston and James, 1996; Johnson, 1997) exclusively rely on annual reports in their
classification of debt. However, companies are not required to report whether debt is
publicly traded or privately held. Thus debt structure data collected from annual reports
only is likely to be very noisy.
Besides the bargaining-based perspective, there are, of course, important other theo-
retical explanations for the choice between dispersed (public) and concentrated (private)
debt. Accounting for these factors in the empirical specification is important as they may
dominate the more subtle motives of strategic actions. The most prominent among these
is a theory based on information asymmetries in which banks are assumed to have a com-
parative advantage in gathering relevant information about the borrower. Firms plagued
with severe information asymmetries are predicted to borrow predominantly from banks
since the adverse selection problems would lead to excessive costs of public debt. Trans-
parent firms, on the other hand, prefer to borrow in the public debt markets to avoid bank
monitoring costs. The models in Diamond (1989, 1991) build on this information-based
argument. In these models reputational capital provides incentives to prevent moral haz-
ard. Established, highly rated firms borrow in public debt markets as they have sufficient
incentives to avoid moral hazard. Young, lower rated firms, on the other hand, need bank
monitoring to provide them with such incentives.
Other theoretical approaches focus on banks’ flexibility in making liquidation versus
reorganization decisions (Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994; Berlin and Loeys, 1988). Firms
with a higher likelihood of financial distress will value this flexibility more than low-risk
firms and will hence be more prone to choose bank debt than safe firms. Further, there
are reasons to expect a positive relation between firm size and reliance on public debt. As
Blackwell and Kidwell (1988) and Fama (1985) point out, the high (fixed) issuance costs
of public debt imply economies of scale which make it more costly for small firms to have
public debt.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 develops in more detail the
set of hypotheses to be tested. I extend the stylized predictions of theoretical models by
relating debt structure to a creditor’s expected loss given default. Section 1.3 describes
the data collection procedure and the final data set. Section 1.4 presents the regression
results. Section 1.5 offers concluding remarks.
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1.2 Testable Hypotheses
The division of ex-post bargaining power between the borrower and the lender plays a
central role in incomplete contract models of debt. In this theoretical framework a lender
who expects himself to be in a weak ex-post bargaining position rationally anticipates the
borrower’s incentives for opportunistic behavior and hence limits the amount of funds he
is willing to provide, at the extreme to the verifiable firm value, the liquidation value. If
the firm would optimally borrow more than the offered amount, for instance because of tax
advantages to debt, this ex-post incentive problem creates ex-ante inefficiency. Given the
choice, the firm would seek to limit its own bargaining power in order to increase its debt
capacity. Thus self-binding devices, if feasible, are relevant whenever the optimal amount
of debt exceeds the verifiable firm value.
Bargaining power depends on a number of factors. First, it clearly depends on the con-
sequences incurred when negotiations fail. A creditor’s bargaining position, for instance,
should be stronger the higher is the liquidation value of his claims relative to their con-
tinuation value. Second, if multiple creditors are involved, bargaining power should also
depend on their ability and willingness to coordinate a response. In general, coordination
problems should make creditors tougher in renegotiations since it is more difficult to obtain
unanimous consent to deviate from the original terms of the contract. In the limit case,
when creditors are highly dispersed, debt may be entirely renegotiation-proof.
Of course, other characteristics of debt also influence the ex-post division of bargaining
power. Creditors of secured or high priority debt will be less willing to make concessions
ex post, as their claims are unlikely to lose value in default. Also, creditors of short-term
debt should be tougher in renegotiations as these claims are served before long-term debt
of equal seniority. In this study I focus on public versus private debt use, but I address
alternative interpretations and causalities related to seniority and maturity in the empirical
section below.
Hege and Mella-Barral (2005), Bolton and Scharfstein (1996), and Bergman and Callen
(1991) argue that publicly traded debt with its dispersed, atomistic bond holders com-
plicates renegotiation due to free-rider problems whereas private debt, usually held by
few, well-coordinated investors, is easier to renegotiate. Hence public debt is proposed
as an appropriate commitment device against strategic behavior, and is predicted to be
predominantly used by firms whose debt capacity with concentrated lenders would be low.
Of course, a main concern is that liquidation values affect the total amount of public
debt for other reasons than strategic default. Firms with low liquidation values relative to
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total assets tend to be less levered in general, and so they also tend to have less public debt.
I address this concern by using dependent variables that condition on the total amount
of debt, first by analyzing only firms with strictly positive debt, and second by defining
the public debt ratio as the ratio of public to total debt (rather than public debt to total
assets). These arguments yield the first hypothesis.
HYPOTHESIS 1 (Liquidation values and the use of public debt):
1a. Given strictly positive leverage, public debt use is more likely when liquidation values
are low.
1b. The public debt ratio is decreasing in liquidation value.
1c. Conditional on strictly positive leverage, firms have more complicated debt structures
in terms of the number of outstanding public debt issues.
The models which yield Hypothesis 1 all assume some that debt is generally desirable,
either because it is subject to favorable tax treatment (Bergman and Callen (1991), Hege
and Mella-Barral (2005), or because it is simply necessary to fund a project (Bolton and
Scharfstein (1996)). However, it has been argued, most notably by Myers (1984), that tax
benefits may not play as important a role as assumed in much of the capital structure
literature. In addition, some firms may be able to finance their investments with internally
generated cash flows and thus do not depend on debt finance. The hypothesis below is
analogous to Hypotheses 1 except that it is independent of the underlying motives for debt
finance, but rather takes the amount of debt as given. As argued above, strategic con-
siderations and commitment become increasingly important the more debt value exceeds
liquidation value. If tangible assets are taken as a proxy for the liquidation value, then the
positive part of the difference between total debt and tangible assets is an upper bound
of the loss to creditors in case renegotiation fail. Whenever tangible assets exceed total
debt borrowers are unlikely to make any concessions in a renegotiation since the liquida-
tion value would most likely cover their claims. On the other hand, when debt exceeds
tangible assets, creditors are more likely to suffer significant losses in a liquidation, and
hence are more willing to make concessions. As a consequence, one should expect that
self-commitment is only relevant when total debt exceeds tangible assets, and only that
portion of total debt exceeding tangible assets should be renegotiation-proof or public.
Thus we have
HYPOTHESIS 2 (Loss given default and the use of public debt):
2a. Public debt use is more likely when creditors’ loss given default is positive.
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2b. The public debt ratio is increasing in creditors’ loss given default as a fraction of total
debt.
2c. Firms have more complicated debt structures in terms of the number of outstanding
public debt issues when creditors’ loss given default is positive.
1.3 Data Description
1.3.1 Data Sources and Sample Selection
This study analyzes a sample of established, medium-sized, and publicly traded U.S. cor-
porations which are constituents of the Russell MidCap Index as of May 31, 2003, the
reconstitution date of the index for that year. The choice of U.S. data has several reasons.
The first is that the evidence on renegotiation frictions in distressed reorganizations to
which the bargaining theories of capital structure are tailored almost exclusively builds
on U.S. data. Second, strategic actions are likely to be more relevant in countries where
legal protection of creditors is relatively weak, because the losses creditors incur in case
of liquidation are likely to be more severe in this case. By international comparison U.S.
bankruptcy law is considered to be particularly debtor-friendly (Franks et al., 1996; La-
Porta et al., 1998). In this respect it is topped only by the U.K. bankruptcy code. Third,
in developed, market-based economies, such as that of the U.S., public debt plays a more
important role than it does in bank-based systems. If dispersion of creditors is indeed im-
portant as a commitment device, it is more likely in market- than in bank-based economies
that this will be reflected in the use of public debt. In bank-based systems, the same pur-
pose may primarily be achieved through multiple bank relationships and syndicated loans
rather than public debt issuance.
The analysis is restricted to established corporations because firms should have, in
principle, access to public debt markets. On the other hand, I choose to focus on medium-
sized companies because many of the largest U.S. corporations entirely rely on public debt.
Including these firms would result in little variation of the dependent variables.
The initial sample comprises all 800 companies of the Russell MidCap index as of May
31, 2003. Financial firms (SIC codes 6000-6999), utilities (SIC codes 4900-4999), and firms
with no debt outstanding are excluded. Of the remaining sample I retain only those firms
for which data is available on COMPUSTAT research and active files. I merge the resulting
data set with analyst forecast data from I/B/E/S. Further, I require that each sample firm
have at least five analyst estimates for fiscal year ends 2000-2002 available in the I/B/E/S
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database.
For the remaining firms I hand-collect detailed information on debt structure from
both 10-K filings and Moody’s/Mergent Industrial Manuals. The data collected includes
the respective amounts of several types of debt (public debt, bank debt, privately placed
bonds, commercial paper, mortgage debt, capitalized leases, and industrial revenue bonds),
the number of public debt issues, and whether the firm has multiple bank relationships.
The Moody’s/Mergent database provides detailed information on the type of each debt
issue. For the vast majority of the bond issues in the sample it identifies whether they
have been publicly issued or privately placed, and whether and when privately placed bonds
have been registered with the SEC. I classify as public debt all bonds that have initially
been publicly issued as well as private placement bonds that have been registered until
fiscal year end 2003. Total debt is defined as short plus long term debt less capitalized
lease obligations, industrial revenue bonds and mortgage debt. I only retain firms in the
sample for which I can identify reliably more than 90% of total debt. This yields a final
sample of 200 firms4.
1.3.2 Dependent Variables
I define three variables that proxy for the degree of creditor dispersion. The first measure
is a dummy variable for public debt use, public debt dummy, which equals one if the firm
has public debt outstanding and zero otherwise. The reason for this definition is that
even a small amount of publicly traded debt may complicate the renegotiation process
considerably while variations in the public debt ratio conditional on its presence may have
little additional effect.
The second measure is the ratio of public to total debt, public debt ratio. Controlling
for size and leverage, firms with high proportions of public to total debt have a creditor
structure which is more dispersed than for firms with lower public debt ratios.
The third measure is the number of bond issues. Some bond issues, even if publicly
traded, may be in the hands of only a few institutional investors. This is particularly
likely for privately placed bonds that are successively registered with the SEC. Firms with
many different bonds outstanding are less likely to have concentrated bond holders. In
addition, different debt issues virtually always differ in at least one of the main features,
4Exclusion of financial firms and regulated utilities resulted in a deletion of 233 firms. Of the remaining
firms 59 had no debt outstanding at fiscal year end 2003. The match with the I/B/E/S database resulted
in 275 deletions. Finally, there were 33 firms for which I could not reliably identify more than 90% of the
debt.
14 CHAPTER 1. DOES PUBLIC DEBT HAVE STRATEGIC VALUE?
seniority, maturity or coupon. As investors usually have distinct preferences regarding
these characteristics, it is unlikely for the same investor(s) to hold different bonds of the
same corporation.
1.3.3 Independent Variables
In order to test Hypotheses 1 and 2, below I define variables that proxy for liquidation
values and loss given default. A weak bargaining position of creditors in a renegotiation is
implied by a low liquidation value or a high loss given default.
Liquidation value. I use three variables to proxy for the costs of liquidation: The
first proxy is the market-to-book ratio, defined as the sum of the book value of debt and
the market value of equity, divided by the book value of total assets. Market-to-book is
inversely related to liquidation values as firms with high market-to-book ratios derive most
of their values from growth option which are lost in liquidation. As a second proxy I use
the fixed assets ratio, defined as the ratio of fixed to total assets. Finally, I use the ratio of
R&D expenditures to sales.
Loss given default. To estimate the losses that are likely to be incurred by creditors
should they decide to liquidate the firm upon default, I define the proxy loss given default
as max{0, (total debt−fixed assets)/total debt}. This variable is zero for firms whose debt
does not exceed the book value of tangible assets. Assuming that tangible assets proxy
for the liquidation value, a commitment problem does not exist for these firms, and public
debt should have no strategic value. Positive values of the variable measure the fraction of
total debt that exceeds tangible assets. The greater is this fraction, the more severe is the
commitment problem and the higher may be the strategic value of public debt.
I now turn to the definitions of the control variables which account for other important
motives for the choice between public and private debt.
Economies of scale. I use two variables that measure the economies of scale in
flotation costs of public debt, firm size and leverage. Issuance costs of public debt typically
contain a large fixed component (Bhagat and Frost, 1986; Smith, 1986; Blackwell and
Kidwell, 1988) implying significant economies of scale. Thus firm size and leverage should
be factors favoring the use of public debt. I measure firm size by the logarithm of total
assets and use book values to calculate leverage.
Information asymmetries and reputation. The presence of information asymme-
tries in debt markets is probably the most prominent explanation for financial interme-
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diation, i.e. the use of private debt. Private lenders are thought to have a comparative
advantage with respect to public bond holders in collecting relevant information ex-ante
and monitoring the borrower ex-post (Leland and Pyle, 1977; Diamond, 1984). Firms
with larger information asymmetries are hypothesized to rely more on private debt and
less on public debt. I employ two measures of information asymmetry that are based on
the accuracy of financial analysts forecasts of earnings per share (EPS). Following Best
and Zhang (1993) I calculate the percentage forecast error, defined as the absolute value
of the difference between the mean EPS forecast made in the final month of fiscal year
2003, divided by the absolute value of the actual EPS for that year. Akin to Krishnaswami
and Subramaniam (1999) and Thomas (2002) I use as a second measure of information
asymmetry the forecast dispersion, defined as the standard deviation of earnings forecasts
for the respective fiscal year end, normalized by the absolute value of actual earnings for
that year.
Finally, I use the firm’s age, defined as the years since the first public listing, as a proxy
for reputation. This is motivated by an argument developed by Diamond (1991), where
reputational capital provides borrowers with incentives to refrain from committing moral
hazard. The model makes a life-cycle prediction about the use of the different debt sources
in which younger firms borrow from private lenders and older firms borrow directly in the
public debt markets.
Default Risk. A number of models have emphasized the flexibility and efficiency of
renegotiation in a liquidity default as an important advantage of private debt (Berlin and
Loeys, 1988; Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994; Detragiache, 1994). Firms with a higher
probability of financial distress will value this flexibility more than low-risk firms and are
thus predicted to rely more heavily on private debt.
I use Idiosyncratic risk, defined as the volatility of excess equity returns relative to
the market return as a measure of default risk. The results however, are not materially
affected if I use total volatility instead. Campbell and Taksler (2003) demonstrate that
market-adjusted idiosyncratic volatility seems to be orders of magnitude more important
for explaining credit spreads (which contain a default risk premium) than market volatility.
In addition, Avramov et al. (2004) show that the link between idiosyncratic volatility and
credit spreads is especially strong for low-rated bond classes where credit spreads are mainly
driven by default risk. Combining this evidence suggests that idiosyncratic volatility is a
predominant firm-specific factor determining default probabilities.5 Idiosyncratic risk is
5Of course, combining a number of relevant factors can lead to a more accurate measure of credit risk.
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computed from weekly equity prices for the three years preceding the sample year. As the
benchmark market return I use the Russell 3000 index. Of course, the variables size and
age are also correlates of default risk.
Agency costs. An important issue for the analysis is to control for the potential
endogeneity of the main variables of interest, the market-to-book ratio, the fixed assets ratio
and the ratio of R&D expenditures to sales. Besides proxying for the relative bargaining
power of the firm vis-a`-vis its borrowers, these variables are closely connected to the firm’s
growth opportunities. Myers (1984) argues that risky debt can induce shareholders in
some states to reject positive net present value projects because the benefits accrue mostly
to debtholders. This underinvestment problem can be controlled, among other things, by
shortening the maturity of the debt claims. Specifically, if the debt matures before the
investment opportunity expires, suboptimal investment incentives are eliminated. Thus
firms with abundant growth opportunities are expected to have smaller proportions of
long-term debt in their capital structure. Barclay and Smith (1995b) and Stohs and Mauer
(1996) find empirical support for this hypothesis. Since public debt is usually long-term
and private debt is predominantly short-term, this can induce the main variables to be
biased. I control for this potential endogeneity by including the ratio of short-term debt
to total debt in the regressions. Following Barclay and Smith (1995b), I define short term
debt as debt maturing within three years from the sample year.
A second potential source of endogeneity is the close link between priority structure
and the choice between private and public debt. Most secured debt is privately held while
public debt is usually unsecured. Stulz and Johnson (1985) argue that the underinvestment
problem can also be reduced if the firm reserves the right to finance new investment projects
with high priority debt. Thus firms with more growth options should have a higher fraction
of high priority claims in their capital structure. Empirical support for this hypothesis was
found by Barclay and Smith (1995a). I control for this source of endogeneity by excluding
the highest priority claims, capitalized leases and mortgages from the definition of total
debt.
1.3.4 Summary Statistics
Table 1.2 presents summary statistics of the main variables. As regards debt structure,
most of the sample firms (181) have a positive amount of public debt outstanding, while
However, in this study common factors such as the yield curve slope and general market conditions are
the same for all firms.
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only 28 firms rely entirely on private debt. The median fraction of public debt is very
high, 87% in the entire sample, and 90% in the subsample that conditions on a positive
amount of public debt. Firms with public debt outstanding have a median of three debt
issues, while the variation is very high, ranging from zero to 19 debt issues at the 5% and
95% quantile, respectively. Surprisingly, the percentage of debt maturing in less than three
years is larger for firms that have public debt outstanding than for those without public
debt. This may be particular to the small sample size of firms that have private debt only.
As expected, the median firm with public debt outstanding is much larger and more
highly leveraged than the median firm whose debt is exclusively provided by private lenders.
Analysts’ forecast errors and dispersion do not seem to vary much across the two subsam-
ples. The median number of years a firm has been publicly listed is significantly larger for
firms that use public debt. There does not seem to be a significant difference in idiosyn-
cratic risk between companies with and without public debt. This is somewhat surprising
as one would expect firms with public debt to be less risky. The insignificance of the dif-
ference may be due to the development of junk bond markets which allow even relatively
risky firms to obtain funds at competitive rates.
Regarding the proxies for strategic factors the results show that firms with private
debt also have higher market-to-book ratios than their counterparts. This is consistent
with Myers’ (1984) prediction that these firms should be less leveraged and therefore less
likely to incur the high costs of public debt issuance. The fixed assets ratio does not
vary significantly across the two subsamples. The fractions of R&D expenditures per sales
are low in both subsamples, the variation, however, is much larger in the sample of firms
which rely exclusively on private debt. This implies that those firms with the highest R&D
intensity avoid the increased disclosure implied by public bond issues.
1.4 Empirical Results
This section presents the regression results for the three different specifications of the
dependent variable, a dummy variable which indicates the use of public debt, the ratio of
public to total debt, and the number of public debt issues.
1.4.1 The Use of Public Debt
Table 1.3 presents the results of regressions estimating the probability of public debt use.
First, note that all control variables have the predicted sign. The coefficients of size and
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leverage are positive and highly significant. The forecast error and dispersion, the proxies
for information asymmetry, significantly decrease the likelihood of a company holding
public debt. The coefficient of age is non-negative but very close to zero and insignificant.
The insignificance of company age may be due to the definition of the proxy for age, which
measures the years since public listing and not the years since first incorporation. Thus
even the firms with the lowest values for age are already quite established and additional
variation in age may not have a significant effect. Finally, the proxy for default risk,
idiosyncratic volatility, seems to have a negative impact on the decision to issue public debt
even though it is not statistically significant at conventional levels. The control variable
for the fraction of debt maturing is not significant. This is surprising but consistent with
the univariate results in Table 1.2.
The proxies for liquidation values, the market-to-book ratio, the fixed assets ratio,
and R&D expenditures are all insignificant. This suggests that, controlling for the level
of leverage, the liquidation value is not a significant determinant for a company to have
public debt in its capital structure. On the other hand, the proxy for loss given default
is statistically significant, but has a negative sign, contrary to Hypothesis 2. This means
that firms whose book value of debt exceeds tangible assets are less likely to have public
debt, or more likely to rely on private debt only. Though the evidence is relatively weak,
it indicates that strategic considerations do not appear to have a first order effect for the
choice of public debt. To the contrary, it seems that, if anything, the ex-post inefficiency of
public debt weakly dominates the ex-ante efficiency, and so firms with few tangible assets
prefer private debt possibly to increase renegotiation efficiency is case of default.
1.4.2 The Ratio of Public to Total Debt
I now turn to the analysis of the determinants of the public debt ratio. Table 1.4 presents
the results. For the control variables I find similar results as in the Probit regressions of
Table 1.3. size and leverage are both significant and enter with the expected sign. Forecast
error and forecast dispersion have the expected negative sign but are insignificant in all
regressions. Contrary to the Probit regressions of the precedent subsection which suggests
that age does not determine whether firms have public debt or not, Table 1.4 indicates
that firm age does seem to be an important determinant for how much public debt firms
have as a fraction of total debt.
The key result is that liquidation values and loss given default are not significant de-
terminants of the public debt ratio. All coefficients are insignificant and, except for R&D
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expenditures, have a sign opposite to that expected. A possible interpretation for
this result is that the ex-ante efficiency and the ex-post inefficiency effects of public debt
essentially offset each other.
1.4.3 The Number of Public Debt Issues
Finally, I examine whether liquidation values and loss given default have an effect on the
complexity of public debt structure. I use the number of public debt issues as a mea-
sure of additional capital structure complexity, because multiple debt issues are typically
associated with multiple classes of investors with differing interests. This should make
agreements in renegotiations more difficult and renegotiation success less likely. The re-
sults are reported in Table 1.5. Overall, most of the explanatory variables are highly
significant and the explanatory power of these variables is quite high with an adjusted R2
ranging between 36 and 41%. Of the control variables, size, age, and leverage are most
significantly associated with the number of bonds outstanding and explain a large part of
the sample variation of the dependent variable.
Except for the market-to-book ratio, the coefficients of the strategic variables have
the opposite sign to the one predicted by Hypotheses 1 and 2. More importantly, signs
are opposite to expectations in the two cases where coefficients are highly significant (for
fixed assets ratio and Loss given default). This result further corroborates the conclusion
that ex-post inefficiency is more relevant than ex-ante efficiency in choosing optimal debt
structure complexity.
1.5 Conclusion
This paper provides the first attempt to document empirically whether concerns about
strategic debt service affect the firm’s choice between public an private debt. Controlling
for other determinants of creditor dispersion, this study tests whether firms which are par-
ticularly prone to opportunistic behavior make increased use of public debt. Incentives for
strategic behavior are measured by different proxies for asset tangibility and, alternatively,
by the percentage by which debt exceeds tangible assets.
The results indicate that strategic considerations do not play a dominant role in the
decision to issue public debt. Although statistical significance is in general weak, the over-
all evidence suggests that, contrary to the prediction, firms tend to rely less on public
debt when the threat of strategic default is more severe. This finding suggests that ex-
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post efficiency is more important than ex-ante efficiency for the optimal degree of creditor
dispersion. It is also consistent with the view that concentrated debt holders are gener-
ally more effective than a dispersed ones in controlling moral hazard problems within a
corporation, strategic default being one of them.
One concern with the analysis is that it makes the extreme assumption that public
debt is highly dispersed while private debt is concentrated. In reality, a public debt issue
may be held by only a few investors and private debt may be provided by multiple banks.
Ideally, one would measure creditor dispersion by the exact number of claim holders, bond
holders plus lending banks and other private investors. Unfortunately such data is not
available. However, in defense of the approach taken in this paper one may argue that, by
issuing public debt, the firm signals its willingness to disperse its creditor structure. Once
public debt is issued, the actual degree of dispersion is no longer under the firm’s control
and can potentially be highly dispersed.
Another concern is that Hypotheses 1 and 2 are based on the assumption that highly
dispersed public debt creates renegotiation frictions that lead to coordination failure in
default. In formal bankruptcy, however, public debt often becomes more coordinated
through the appointment of a creditor committee. The fact that, in reality, public debt
may be more coordinated than assumed, is another possible explanation for the lack of
evidence for strategic concerns.
Finally, creditor dispersion is only one means to limit incentives for strategic behavior.
Priority and maturity are characteristics of debt that can be chosen so as to shift the
balance of bargaining power toward creditors. These may simply be more effective or less
costly means to deter strategic threats, thereby making creditor dispersion less relevant as
a commitment device against opportunistic behavior.
Chapter 2
Asset Substitution: An Empirical
Analysis
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2.1 Introduction
The analogy between a levered firm’s equity and a call option was first noted in the seminal
work by Black and Scholes (1973). According to this view, the presence of defaultable
debt in a firm’s capital structure may induce shareholders to increase risk at the expense
of debtholders. This agency conflict is typically referred to as the asset substitution or risk
shifting problem. Since its first reference in Jensen and Meckling (1976) a large, mostly
theoretical literature has examined the impact of the asset substitution problem on firms’
financing and investment decisions. However, despite the intensive debate, no consensus
has been reached to date as to the actual relevance and magnitude of the problem. This may
be due to the fact that prior empirical research, by examining whether agency problems
are reflected in capital structure, has so far mainly provided indirect support for the asset
substitution hypothesis.
Two aspects complicate inference on the asset substitution conflict. The first regards
the econometric difficulty associated with documenting the causal effect of leverage on
firms’ risk policy. This is due to the apparent endogeneity of leverage in the leverage-risk
relation. Our knowledge of what determines optimal operational risk is far from complete,
and the empirical literature has so far provided only mixed evidence on the determinants
of risk policy. It is therefore likely that there exist unknown or unobservable factors
which simultaneously affect firms’ financing and risk policy, as leverage and risk are closely
related. Failure to account for these unobservable factors will produce biased coefficients
in a reduced form regression of risk on leverage. In addition, there is a causality issue in
the leverage-risk relation. Tradeoff models of capital structure building on the Modigliani
and Miller (1958, 1963) assumptions typically assume the firm’s underlying asset risk to be
exogenous while leverage is endogenously determined. Since asset risk increases expected
bankruptcy costs, this framework predicts a negative, causal effect of asset risk on leverage.
The agency view, on the other hand, predicts a positive, causal effect of leverage on asset
risk.
The second difficulty is the measurement of asset volatility. Except for purely equity-
financed firms, asset volatility is unobserved. Therefore, in the past, most studies have
used rough measures of firm risk, such as company size or R&D expenditures. Others have
employed equity volatility which includes both operating and financial risk.
The present paper addresses both of these concerns. The measurement problem is
addressed by inferring asset volatility from equity prices using contingent claim firm value
models. In estimating implied volatilities, I follow recent work by Vassalou and Xing (2004),
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Fang and Zhong (2004) and Larsen (2006). The endogeneity concerns are addressed by
employing instrumental variables methods which exploit exogenous sources of variation in
leverage.
The results indicate that a causal effect of leverage on asset volatility exists. However,
this effect is statistically and economically significant only for long-term leverage, that is,
when leverage is defined as the ratio of long-term debt to total assets or market value. An
increase in long-term leverage of 10 percentage points results, on average, in an increase in
asset volatility of between 3.4 and 6.9 percentage points. The coefficients of total leverage,
on the other hand, are statistically insignificant at conventional levels. This is consistent
with the predictions of theoretical models such as Leland and Toft (1998), which argue
that short-term debt significantly reduces risk-shifting incentives.
Further results show that risk-taking incentives as provided by executive compensation,
in particular through executive stock options, aggravate the asset substitution problem.
CEOs whose fraction of option value in total compensation is above median show a sub-
stantially higher sensitivity of asset risk with respect to long-term leverage than their below
median counterparts. In fact, for CEOs receiving high-powered incentives, the sensitivity
of asset volatility to leverage is statistically significant even for total leverage, not only for
long-term leverage. This is an interesting finding in that it indicates a tradeoff between
two fundamental agency conflicts: By improving shareholder-manager alignment incentive
compensation seems to exacerbate the shareholder-bondholder conflict regarding the choice
of asset risk.
In addition, I provide evidence that asset composition appears to be important for
risk shifting. Firms with low proportions of fixed assets, short asset maturity and large
amounts of liquid assets, are more prone to asset substitution. This reflects the fact that
actual risk policy depends not only on incentives but also on the ability to shift risk. A
company which operates primarily long-lived, fixed assets may simply not be able to shift
operational risk in response to capital structure changes as easily a company which owns
mostly short-lived or liquid assets.
Finally, my results suggests that ownership concentration mitigates leverage-induced
risk-taking. This may, at first sight, appear counterintuitive as ownership concentration
should motivate or force managers to act in shareholders’ interests. However, blockholders
with large stakes in a particular firm are likely to be highly underdiversified and hence may
prefer lower risk levels than diversified investors, in particular when leverage is high.
This paper extends the limited literature which tries to provide direct evidence on
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the asset substitution hypothesis. Brown et al. (1996), Chevalier and Ellison (1997), and
Brown et al. (2001) show that risk shifting can be observed in the mutual and hedge fund
industries where fund managers have option-like compensation schemes. Recent work by
Fang and Zhong (2004) and Larsen (2006) examines risk shifting for U.S. industrial firms
using implied volatilities. These studies do not, however, account for endogeneity which is
the main motivation for the empirical setup in this paper. Further, they do not provide
evidence of the role of shareholder-manager alignment and ownership concentration, nor
on the role of asset tangibility in the context of asset substitution.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 lays out the empirical frame-
work and details how the endogeneity issue is addressed. Section 2.3 describes the models
and estimation method used to infer asset volatility. Section 2.4 describes the data. Sec-
tion 2.5 presents the main results while sections 2.7 and 2.6 analyze asset composition,
executive compensation and ownership concentration in the context of asset substitution.
Section 2.8 concludes.
2.2 Empirical Framework
2.2.1 The Leverage-Risk Relation
The main problem with identifying the causal effect of leverage on firms’ operational risk
is the endogenous nature of leverage. The theoretical and empirical literature modeling
leverage as a choice variable is among the most extensive ones in corporate finance. How-
ever, the mere fact that leverage is chosen by shareholders or management would not, per
se, create an endogeneity problem in the statistical sense if all determinants of leverage
and risk were observable. In that case, a regression of asset risk on leverage and all joint
determinants of leverage and risk would produce a consistent estimate of leverage’s effect
on risk policy.
The endogeneity problem arises from the fact that unobservable or unknown factors
are likely to be important determinants of both leverage and firm risk. This is particularly
apparent in the case of corporate risk policy. Even though there exists a large literature
on hedging, the empirical evidence to date is far from being conclusive. For instance,
examining the extent of corporate derivatives use, Guay and Kothari (2003) find the ac-
tual reduction in exposure due to hedging to be so small as to question the relevance of
many theoretical and empirical findings on firms’ derivatives use. In another recent study
analyzing the determinants of corporate hedging policy in a large cross-country sample,
2.2. EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK 33
Bartram et al. (2004) find evidence clearly counter to the most widely-cited theories. This
suggests that our knowledge about what drives firms’ risk profiles is still very limited, and
it is reasonable to believe that unknown and unobservable factors play an important role
in this context.
The second reason for endogeneity in the risk-leverage relation is that causality may run
in both directions. The strand of literature building on the Modigliani and Miller (1958,
1963) assumptions that investment and financing decisions are independent, commonly
assumes asset volatility to be an exogenous variable affecting optimal leverage. In classical
tradeoff models of capital structure, higher asset volatility increases expected bankruptcy
cost thus decreasing optimal leverage. Agency theory, on the other hand, argues that
leverage has a causal effect on firms’ risk policy. The asset substitution hypothesis states
that leverage creates incentives to increase firm risk. It is likely, therefore, that both effects
are at play at the same time. Since the two causal relations work in opposite directions, a
reduced form regression will produce a downward biased coefficient for the effect of leverage
on risk.
2.2.2 The Empirical Model
To account for the endogeneity in the leverage-risk relation I estimate the following empir-
ical model:
∆σit = α1σi,t−1 + α2∆LEVit + α3∆X1it + α4Z1it + ²1it (2.1)
∆LEVit = β1LEVi,t−1 + β2∆X1it + β3Z2it + ²2it (2.2)
Equation (2.1), the volatility equation, models changes in asset volatility as a function
of lagged volatility, leverage changes, changes in common determinants, ∆X1it, and instru-
ments Z1it. Equation (2.2) is the leverage equation. It relates changes in leverage to lagged
leverage, changes in common determinants, ∆X1t, and instruments Z2it.
The estimation of equations (2.1) and (2.2) with two-stage least squares (2SLS) im-
plements an estimator akin to the so-called ”difference-GMM” estimator developed by
Anderson and Hsiao (1982) and Arellano and Bond (1991). The motivation for the differ-
ence specification lies in the need to eliminate fixed effects in a dynamic panel model. The
lagged dependent variables represent internal instruments which exploit the strong mean
reversion of both volatility and leverage. In addition to these, I also employ external instru-
ments. The use of external instruments is essential in this case as the endogeneity concerns
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do not only arise from the (time-invariant) fixed effect but also from time-varying shocks
to both volatility and leverage that may be driven by a common unobservable variable.
To see how time-varying unobservables can affect the estimate of the coefficient of
interest, α2, assume that a shock in a common variable, ∆ut, affects both volatility and
leverage. If the source of the shock is unobservable, its effect is captured in both error
terms, ²1it and ²2it. Without accounting for this, the estimate of α2 will be biased and
inconsistent, because leverage changes are correlated with the error term in equation (2.1),
corr(∆LEVt, ²1it) 6= 0. To illustrate this point, assume that an unobservable change in
firm fundamentals increases business risk and simultaneously decreases optimal leverage.
Then, a reduced form regression of the volatility equation will produce a downward biased
estimate of the leverage coefficient.
As an external instrument for leverage changes I use the after-financing marginal tax
rate as proposed by Graham (1996). Graham shows that the after-financing marginal
tax rate is significantly correlated with incremental financing decisions. As an external
instrument for volatility changes I use market-wide fluctuations in volatility.
The main results of this study are based on the specification of the system given by
equations (2.1) and (2.2), which does not explicitly allow for reverse causation. However, in
Section 2.5.2 I also present the estimation results for the following simultaneous equations
model which explicitly accounts for the feedback of assets volatility on leverage:
∆σit = α1σi,t−1 + α2∆LEVit + α3∆X1it + α4Z1it + ²1it (2.3)
∆LEVit = β1LEVi,t−1 + β2∆σit + β3∆X1it + β4Z2it + ²2it (2.4)
The results for the simultaneous equations model are very similar to the ones obtained
from the baseline model.
2.3 Estimating Asset Volatility
To infer firms’ asset volatility I estimate an unlevered version of equity volatility. Tradi-
tionally, firms’ fundamental risk has been measured using proxies such as industry class,
research and development expenditures, variation in operating income or equity volatility.
While equity volatility contains both operating and financial risk, all other proxies share
the feature that they use very few observations. Operating income data, for instance, is
at best available at a quarterly frequency. A main advantage of inferring asset volatilities
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from equity prices is the availability of high frequency data which potentially yields much
more accurate estimates.
Asset volatility is, in general, not observed except for purely equity financed firms. A
model that relates asset volatility with equity volatility and leverage is therefore needed to
recover asset volatilities from stock prices. There exist a host of different contingent-claim
models of firm value, so that the issue of robustness to model choice naturally arises. To
reduce robustness concerns with respect to model structure and assumptions, I employ a
range of structural firm value models which are described briefly below.
2.3.1 The Models
I use the structural models of Black&Scholes (1973), Leland (1994) and Leland&Toft (1996)
to calculate implied asset volatilities from stock prices. For brevity of exposition I discuss
only the main features of the models in the main body of the paper. The specific formulas
are relegated to the appendix.
Consider first the common characteristics of the three models. The fundamental vari-
able in all models is the asset value (the value of the unlevered firm) which is assumed to
follow a geometric Brownian motion under the risk-neutral probability measure:
dVt = Vt(r − δ)dt+ VtσV dWt, (2.5)
where Vt is the asset value, r is the risk-free interest rate, δ is the payout rate, and σV
is the volatility of the asset value. W is a standard Brownian motion.
The firm’s capital structure consists of two classes of securities, equity and debt. Denote
by Et the market value of equity and by Dt the market value of the firm’s debt. Firm value
is the sum of the market values of equity and debt.
In all three models, equity is viewed as a call option on a firm’s assets. This implies
a common relation between equity volatility, leverage and asset volatility. Applying Iˆto’s
lemma to the equity value, one obtains
σE = σV
∂E/E
∂V/V
, (2.6)
where the elasticity of the equity value with respect to the asset value, ²E,V =
∂E/E
∂V/V
,
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is always greater than one. The extent to which equity volatility is scaled down to asset
volatility depends on the specific model and parameter choice. The main determinants
of the elasticity are discussed in detail in section 2.4.2 below along with the estimation
results.
The main differences between the three models are the following: First, the models
differ in their specification of default. In Black&Scholes default can occur only at maturity.
Equity is thus equivalent to a European call option. In the Leland and Leland&Toft models
default occurs when the asset value hits an endogenous default barrier, VB, which can
happen any time in the interval [0,T]. In these models equity is analogous to a down-an-
out barrier option.
Second, in Black&Scholes, the firm value is equal to the value of the assets while the
Leland and Leland&Toft models incorporate tax benefits and bankruptcy cost. Coupon
payments are tax-deductable at rate τ and favor the use of debt while a fraction α of
the asset value is lost in case of bankruptcy which counterbalances the tax advantages of
debt. Firm value in the latter models is thus the sum of the asset value, tax benefits, and
bankruptcy costs.
A third difference regards the assumptions about debt maturity. In Black&Scholes,
there is a single, homogenous class of debt which is repayable at maturity T . The Le-
land model assumes perpetual debt which promises a continuous coupon rate C. In Le-
land&Toft, new debt is issued and old debt is repayed continuously. While the maturity
at issuance is the same for all issues, the firm has a continuum of debt issues outstanding
with maturities spanning the entire interval [0,T].
In sum, the three models contain a number of features, the Leland&Toft model being
the richest and probably the most realistic one among them. Other models that could
potentially be considered are those that allow for deviations from absolute priority (or
strategic default), models incorporating multiple classes of debt with respect to seniority
and protective covenants. While estimation of asset volatilities is, in principle, feasible
for the latter models, the correlation of implied volatilities across the different models is
likely to be fairly high due to the common contingent claim setup. Section 2.4.2 shows
that the correlations among asset volatilities implied by the Black&Scholes, Leland, and
Leland&Toft models are above 95%.
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2.3.2 Implementation
To estimate asset volatilities I use the KMV algorithm, an iterative procedure proposed
by Crosbie and Bohn (2003) which has become increasingly popular in academic work
recently. Traditionally, asset volatilities have been estimated by solving a system of simul-
taneous equations given by the formula for the equity value and equation (2.6) for the two
unobserved variables asset volatility and asset value. However there is no proof of consis-
tency of the simultaneous equations approach. On the other hand, recent theoretical work
demonstrates consistency of the KMV method for estimating asset volatilities, showing the
equivalence of the KMV and maximum likelihood methods (Duan et al., 2004).
I follow Vassalou and Xing (2004), Fang and Zhong (2004), and Larsen (2006) in
adapting the KMV algorithm to the respective models of Black&Scholes, Leland and Le-
land&Toft. To start the algorithm I use equity volatility as an initial guess for asset
volatility. In a second step, the endogenous default barrier is calculated based on the
initial volatility estimate for the Leland and Leland&Toft models. Note that this is not
necessary for the Black&Scholes model. Next, asset values are computed for each day
over the estimation window by inverting the respective pricing formula for equity. The
obtained time series of asset values is then used to update the estimate of asset volatility.
This procedure is repeated until σA converges. The tolerance level for convergence is set
to 10e−5.
To implement the estimation procedure, a number of input parameters are need to be
specified. In the following I discuss the specification of these inputs which are summarized
in Table 2.1. All three models require values for the debt principal, P , the equity value,
the risk-free rate, r, the payout rate, δ, the default threshold, VB, and debt maturity, T .
I set the principal amount, P , to Compustat’s total debt. Equity value for a given day
is calculated as the number of shares outstanding multiplied by the closing price. The
risk-free interest rate is set to the 1-year constant maturity Treasury bill rate obtained
from the Federal Reserve. The payout rate is set to 0.06, which according to Huang
and Huang (2003) reflects the historical average payout rate for a large sample of U.S.
firms. The default threshold is set to total debt for the Black&Scholes model, while it is
endogenously determined in the Leland and Leland&Toft models. For the Black&Scholes
and Leland&Toft models I follow Larsen (2006) in calculating debt maturity as the weighted
average maturity using Compustat data on debt due within the first to fifth year and long-
term debt. Consistent with Larsen (2006), the maturity of debt due after the fifth year is
set to 8.5 years. The Leland model needs no specification of maturity as debt is assumed
38 CHAPTER 2. ASSET SUBSTITUTION: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
to be infinitely lived.
The Black&Scholes model requires the dividend rate as an additional input. This is
calculated as log(1 + Dividends/(E + P )), where E is the equity value at fiscal year end.
The Leland and Leland&Toft models also require inputs for the corporate tax rate, τ , the
proportional bankruptcy costs, α, and the total coupon, C. I set τ = 20% and α = 15%.
The coupon is calculated as (r + spread(T )) · P where spread is set to the average yield
spread on corporate bonds in the industrial sector as estimated by Duffee (1998) in the
respective maturity bracket.
Table 2.1: Parameter definitions.
Assigned Value
Parameter Notation Black/Scholes/Merton Leland Leland/Toft
Equity value E Pt ·Nt Pt ·Nt Pt ·Nt
Debt Principal P Total debt Total Debt Total Debt
Debt Maturity T Weighted average - Weighted average
Debt Coupon C - (r + spread(T)) · P (r + spread(T)) · P
Risk-free rate r 1-year T-bill rate 1-year T-bill rate 1-year T-bill rate
Default barrier VB P endogenous endogenous
Tax rate τ - 20% 20%
Bankruptcy costs α - 15% 15%
Dividend rate γ log(1 + DividendsE+P ) - -
Payout rate δ 0.06 0.06 0.06
2.4 Data
2.4.1 Sample Selection
The analysis is based on a large sample of panel data. The accounting data are taken
from Compustat’s U.S. research and active files over the period 1987 to 2003. Firms in the
public and private transportation, communications and utility sectors (SIC codes 4000-
4999), the financial sector (SIC 6000-6999), and government-related corporations (SIC
9100-9999) are deleted to avoid any issues with regulation, since risk shifting is less likely
to be observable in firms where the discretion of management is constrained by regulation.
I further restrict the sample to exclude firm years with a minimum book value of assets
below $10 million (inflation adjusted to 2000 dollars), and those firm years with missing
data on total assets, net sales, debt in current liabilities, long-term debt, market value of
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equity, operating income before depreciation, and net property, plant and equipment. The
remaining sample is merged with daily stock price data from Datastream. Of the resulting
sample I retain firm years for which price data is available for at least 100 trading days
in a given fiscal year. Finally, I exclude 24 firm years where book leverage is greater than
one.1 In unreported analysis I find that the results are robust to the inclusion of these
firm years. Finally, I intersect my original data with Graham’s (1996) marginal tax rates
data. Depending on the asset volatility measure employed, the final sample for the baseline
instrumental variables regressions contains between 19,226 and 19,731 observations.
2.4.2 Asset Volatilities: Summary Statistics
Table 2.2 displays descriptive statistics of the estimated annualized asset volatilities along
with the endogenous default thresholds for the Leland and Leland&Toft models. The rows
in the upper part of the table contain the medians of the respective estimates for the entire
sample of firms, year by year, over the sample period from 1987 to 2003. Column 1 contains
equity volatility. Columns 2 to 4 report the asset volatility estimates as implied by the
three models. The time-series of median volatilities is graphically illustrated in Figure 2.1.
In addition, the lower solid line in the figure plots the volatilities of an equal-weighted
portfolio comprised of all stocks in the sample.
Column 1 contains the equity volatilities. The high level of volatility at the beginning of
the sample period is primarily due to the stock market crash in October 1987 which caused
daily returns of the equal-weighted portfolio of up to -14%. Following the recovery in 1988
and 1989, equity volatilities were strongly upward trending until 2000, again followed by
a sharp decline during the last years of the sample period. Interestingly, the time-series
of portfolio volatilities (bottom solid line in Figure 2.1) shows no similar pattern. This
indicates that the upward trend in individual firms’ total volatility is mainly due to an
increase in idiosyncratic volatility, a fact that has been also documented by Campbell
et al. (2001) and Goyal and Santa-Clara (2003).
The overall level of equity volatility may appear high at first sight, but is consistent with
other studies on total volatility. Using the entire CRSP database over the period 1962-1999
Goyal and Santa-Clara (2003) obtain an average annualized volatility of individual stocks
of 56.81% (
√
12 · 0.1640), with higher values towards the end of their sample period. This
1Although it would be interesting to study the risk behavior of firms close to default, the concern
with overindebted companies is that they may actually be in default so that management’s discretion over
investment policy is likely to be constrained.
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compares to the 62.43% volatility averaged over all firms and years in my sample. They
also find that average individual stock volatility is more than four times higher than the
volatility of an equal-weighted portfolio constructed from the same stocks. This relation,
again, is in line with the average portfolio volatility of 12.95% in my sample.
Columns 2 to 4 contain the asset volatility estimates for the Black&Scholes, Leland, and
Leland&Toft models. As implied by the model, structure all asset volatilities are smaller
than the equity volatilities. By how much equity volatility is scaled down to asset volatility
depends on the model structure and parameter specification which determine the elasticity
of equity with respect to the asset value, ²E,A. Even though there are a large number
of parameters that affect the size of the elasticity, and comparative statics are somewhat
complex, two factors are of particular importance: default barrier and debt maturity.
To understand the direction of the effects, assume for simplicity that the default barrier
is fixed exogenously. Then a higher default barrier implies a larger elasticity, ²E,A, and thus
a smaller asset volatility for a given equity volatility. Intuitively, this is because, with a
high barrier, an increase in asset value not only increases the expected value of the payoff
at maturity, but it also lowers the probability of early default. This explains why barrier
models typically imply lower asset volatilities than the Black&Scholes model.
The second main factor, maturity, affects the scaling of equity volatility via two chan-
nels. First, shorter maturity increases the endogenous default threshold thus decreasing
²E,A, but, in addition, has a separate effect increasing ²E,A. In contrast to Black&Scholes,
the Leland model has a strictly positive default threshold which increases ²E,A while, on
the other hand, it assumes infinite maturity which decreases ²E,A. This is the reason why
asset volatilities implied by the Leland model are not always smaller or larger than those
implied by the Black&Scholes model as can be seen in columns 2 and 3 of Table 2.2 and
Figure 2.1. The Leland&Toft model, which has both a default barrier and finite matu-
rity, generates asset volatilities which are strictly lower than those implied by both the
Black&Scholes and the Leland models.
Columns 5 to 7 display the respective default thresholds of the three models. By
definition, the barrier of the Black&Scholes model is zero, while the Leland&Toft model
generally implies higher barriers than the Leland model, especially for intermediate and
short maturities. This is because the need to redeem debt places a much higher burden on
firm’s cash flows.
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Table 2.2: Asset volatilities and default barriers. The table presents summary statistics of the
asset volatility and default barrier estimates obtained from the Black&Scholes, Leland, and Leland&Toft
models. Columns 1 to 4 in the upper part of the table contain the medians of the volatility estimates
by year. Columns 5 to 7 contain the estimates of the default barrier (which is zero by assumption for
the Black&Scholes model). The lower part of the table displays summary statistics for the entire sample
period.
ASSET VOLATILITIES DEFAULT THRESHOLDS
Year σE σBS σL σLT V BSB V
L
B V
LT
B N
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1987 0.5351 0.4104 0.3973 0.3712 0.0000 0.4444 0.6486 923
1988 0.4692 0.3330 0.3114 0.2997 0.0000 0.5454 0.7131 958
1989 0.3978 0.2800 0.2731 0.2648 0.0000 0.5862 0.7475 1,041
1990 0.5074 0.3578 0.3441 0.3224 0.0000 0.4974 0.7153 1,090
1991 0.5410 0.3777 0.3745 0.3476 0.0000 0.4447 0.6923 1,200
1992 0.5447 0.4087 0.4058 0.3730 0.0000 0.3913 0.6697 1,346
1993 0.5267 0.4275 0.4254 0.3903 0.0000 0.3606 0.6685 1,519
1994 0.5132 0.4062 0.4097 0.3835 0.0000 0.4216 0.6723 1,677
1995 0.5027 0.4049 0.4131 0.3847 0.0000 0.3706 0.6709 1,831
1996 0.5367 0.4495 0.4508 0.4272 0.0000 0.3527 0.6494 2,001
1997 0.5222 0.4362 0.4389 0.4150 0.0000 0.3449 0.6477 2,100
1998 0.5974 0.4845 0.4941 0.4505 0.0000 0.2727 0.6015 2,130
1999 0.6406 0.5288 0.5276 0.4838 0.0000 0.2930 0.6050 2,118
2000 0.7400 0.5884 0.5983 0.5342 0.0000 0.2342 0.5732 2,128
2001 0.6512 0.5141 0.5272 0.4707 0.0000 0.2662 0.6074 2,120
2002 0.5931 0.4702 0.4809 0.4425 0.0000 0.2586 0.6087 2,089
2003 0.4611 0.3665 0.3727 0.3479 0.0000 0.3408 0.6697 1,707
Mean 0.6371 0.5206 0.5209 0.4827 0.0000 0.3744 0.6232 -
Median 0.5557 0.4399 0.4411 0.4084 0.0000 0.3423 0.6451 -
Std 0.3617 0.3475 0.3502 0.3242 0.0000 0.2201 0.1880 -
5% Quantile 0.2328 0.1349 0.1237 0.1094 0.0000 0.0755 0.2839 -
95% Quantile 1.3397 1.1889 1.2025 1.1086 0.0000 0.7815 0.8911 -
2.4.3 Measures of Leverage
I measure the firm’s capital structure using a range of leverage specifications. For the base
case I use two market-based measures of leverage. The first is simply market leverage,
LEV-MV, defined as the sum of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities, divided by
the firm’s market value. The second is long-term market leverage, LEV-LT-MV, defined
as long-term debt divided by market value. Market leverage is the specification which
best reflects the spirit of contingent claims models as default risk is a function of the
distance between the market value of assets and the default threshold. The use of long-
term leverage has the additional advantage of allowing an analysis of the impact of debt
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Figure 2.1: Time-series of volatilities. The upper four lines of the figure plot the median of the
respective volatility estimates by year, as shown in Table 2.2. The lower solid line plots the volatility of
an equal-weighted portfolio of the stocks in the sample.
maturity structure on asset substitution. Many models, including Leland&Toft, predict
more pronounced risk shifting incentives when debt is long-term rather than short-term.
For additional robustness I also use book-based measures of leverage, LEV-BV and
LEV-LT-BV, defined as the sum of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities, divided
by the book value of assets, and long-term debt divided by the book value of assets,
respectively. This specification has the advantage of being less dependent on stock price
fluctuations and may more adequately reflect a firm’s target capital structure. In addition,
employing book leverage avoids a subtle causation mechanism which can bias the inference
on the agency motive: Suppose the stock price drops sharply due to some exogenous shock
to firm prospects. For a levered firm, this will imply an increase in market leverage (but
not book leverage) and equity volatility. Some of that increase in volatility may seep into
asset volatility and hence give the impression of asset substitution even if management
takes no action to increase risk.2
2I thank Rene´ Stulz for pointing this out to me.
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2.4.4 Instruments
The main challenge in accounting for endogeneity in the proposed empirical framework is
to identify valid instruments. In the case of the leverage-risk relation this is particularly
intricate for two reasons: First, there is no established empirical literature on the firm-
specific factors driving optimal operational risk. Second, leverage and risk are so closely
related that it is difficult to find variables that significantly affect leverage but not asset
volatility or vice versa. For instance, if one considers the most established determinants
of leverage, such as size, market-to-book, profitability, and tangible assets, one can easily
argue that they also affect asset risk. Larger firms are usually more diversified. Firms with
high market valuations possess more (risky) growth options. More profitable businesses
are, on average, more mature and hence less risky. And finally, tangible assets generate
more stable cash flows than intangibles.
The autoregressive nature of both leverage and volatility suggests the use of lagged
levels as instruments for changes in these variables. As shown in Table 2.3, lagged leverage
(lagged asset volatility) is highly negatively correlated with the change in leverage (asset
volatility). This indicates strong mean reversion in both variables, a fact that makes lagged
levels well-suited as instruments.
For the leverage equation I use a second, external instrument in addition to lagged
leverage: the after-financing marginal tax rate, MTR. Graham (1996) demonstrates that
a simulated version of the after financing tax rate is positively related with incremental
financing decisions. The univariate correlation of the marginal tax rate with leverage
changes does not appear very high (0.07), but it is much higher than its correlation with
risk changes (-0.01). Further, as will be shown in Section 2.5, due to the inverse relation
between leverage and the after-financing marginal tax rate, the latter becomes highly
significant in a multivariate regression once leverage is controlled for.
I also identify a second instrument for the volatility equation, the market-wide change
in asset volatility, ∆σMKT . It is defined as the change in the median asset volatility over
all firms in the sample. Using market-wide volatility changes in the regression specification
is important not only because it provides a good instrument, but also because it controls
for volatility changes that may be due to market sentiment or other factors unrelated to
operational risk changes. Figure 2.1 shows that the stock market crash of 1987 and the
dot-com bubble in the late 1990s caused high volatility in equity markets. By virtue of
the estimation setup, any non-fundamental changes in equity volatility will be reflected in
asset volatilities and should thus be controlled for.
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The univariate correlations with firm-specific volatility changes are high (between 0.28
and 0.30) while its correlation with leverage changes is relatively low (0.09). I use asset
volatilities implied by the Leland model to compute market-wide median volatilities. Due
to the high correlations of ∆σBS, ∆σL, and ∆σLT results are unchanged when using any
of the other models.
Table 2.3: Correlations. The table displays Spearman correlations between the main variables of
interest.
LEV-
MV
∆LEV-
MV σ
BS σL σLT ∆σBS ∆σL ∆σLT ∆σMKTMTR
LEV-MV 1.00
∆LEV-MV -0.20 1.00
σBS -0.36 0.06 1.00
σL -0.37 0.06 0.98 1.00
σLT -0.45 0.08 0.97 0.98 1.00
∆σBS 0.05 -0.07 -0.25 -0.23 -0.23 1.00
∆σL 0.06 -0.06 -0.24 -0.24 -0.23 0.96 1.00
∆σLT 0.06 -0.15 -0.25 -0.25 -0.25 0.96 0.97 1.00
∆σMKT -0.01 0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.07 0.29 0.30 0.28 1.00
MTR -0.10 0.07 -0.32 -0.31 -0.29 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 1.00
2.4.5 Common Explanatory Variables
Due to the close relation between leverage and risk, a number of variables are likely to
affect both leverage and risk. My first control is the change in firm size, ∆SIZE, defined
as the change in log sales. Larger firms are usually more diversified and less concentrated
geographically than small firms. This makes them less risky and, in turn, reduces the cost
of capital allowing them to take a higher debt load. In addition, they often have better
access to public debt markets which also increases their debt capacity.
As a second control I use the change in the market-to-book ratio, ∆MTB, to proxy
for growth opportunities. Growth opportunities should be negatively related to asset risk,
because the option-like nature of these assets makes them more risky than tangible assets.
Their uncertain nature should also support less debt in the firm’s capital structure. In
addition, firms with many growth options may borrow less, because this could induce them
to follow suboptimal investment strategies in the sense of the underinvestment problem
formalized by Myers (1977).
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As a third control I use the change in profitability, ∆PROFIT. PROFIT is defined as
operating income before depreciation, divided by sales. Profitability is frequently argued to
be negatively related with leverage because of a pecking order of financing (Myers, 1984).
Due to the costs of external financing, internal funds are thought to be the preferred source
of funds used to finance investments. Therefore, highly profitable firms need to resort less
to external financing and thus have lower debt ratios. Profitability may, on the other hand,
also be related to firm risk. Young, risky firms typically have negative or relatively low
profits while they become profitable as they mature and risk declines.
My fourth control is the change in tangible assets, ∆PPE. Tangible assets are defined
as the ratio of or property, plant, and equipment to total assets. Tangible assets should
be negatively correlated with firm risk, because they typically generate more stable cash
flows than intangible capital. They are positively related with leverage since, in addition
to their lower riskiness, they provide collateral which increases borrowing capacity.
All variables which are ratios, i.e. MTB, PROFIT, and PPE, are winsorized at the one
percent level to reduce outlier problems.
Finally, I use a rating dummy, RATED, as a control. Being rated implies access to
public debt markets and thus allows firms to increase their debt levels more easily than
unrated firms. On the other hand, the rating is likely related to changes in operational
risk. Executives care a lot about their companies’ rating (see, for instance, Graham and
Harvey (2001)) and should, on average, be reluctant to implement operational strategies
that would lower their rating. The rating dummy takes the value of one if the firm has a
non-default rating by Standard&Poors, and zero otherwise.
2.5 Main Results
2.5.1 The Basic Instrumental Variables Regressions
Table 2.4 presents the first stage leverage regressions for the base case where leverage is
defined in terms of market values. For each of the dependent variables I run four regressions:
one without any instruments, one regression with only one of the respective instruments,
and a fourth regression containing all instruments.
The instruments have the expected sign and are significant whether used alone or jointly.
The magnitude of the coefficient of the marginal tax rate is similar to that obtained by
Graham (1996). The second instrument, lagged leverage, is highly significant indicating
strong mean reversion in leverage ratios. When both instruments are included in the
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regression, R2 more than doubles (from 0.04 to 0.09 and from 0.03 to 0.09 in the LEV-
MV and LEV-LT-MV regression, respectively). This shows that the instruments make a
significant contribution to the leverage equation supporting their validity.
The common variables, ∆SIZE, ∆MTB, ∆PROFIT, and ∆PPE are all significant and
have the expected sign. The rating dummy has the expected positive sign in all regressions
where lagged levels of leverage is included. It has a negative sign in all other cases. A
possible reason for this could be that rated firms are typically more highly levered than
non-rated firms and thus have less need to further increase debt. When leverage is not
controlled for, rating may not only proxy (positively) for the access to debt markets but
also (negatively) for the need to increase debt.
Table 2.5 presents the results of the second stage regressions of asset volatility changes
on leverage changes and control variables. Column 1 though 4 display regression results on
total debt market leverage, ∆LEV-MV. Column 1 reports the reduced form OLS regres-
sion. The leverage coefficient is negative and highly significant in both cases, indicating
that, on average, increases in leverage are associated with decreases in firm risk. Columns 2
to 4 present the results of the instrumental variables regressions estimated with 2SLS. The
signs of the leverage coefficient are not robust across the three proxies for asset volatil-
ity. However, even though the leverage coefficients using implied volatilities from the
Black&Scholes and Leland models are negative, they are not significant. When using the
Leland&Toft implied volatility the sign is positive and significant. In sum, when using
total debt leverage, results are mixed and it is not clear, whether risk shifting is important
or not. However, the coefficients and t-statistics in the 2SLS regressions suggest that the
instrumental variables approach controls for much of the endogeneity in the leverage-risk
relation.
Columns 5 through 8 display the results for long-term market leverage, ∆LEV-LT-
MV. Again, in the reduced form regression, the leverage coefficient is negative and highly
significant. In the instrumental variables regressions, however, the leverage coefficient is
positive, highly significant and robust across the models. This suggests that risk shifting
is important especially when firms issue long-term debt. This result is consistent with the
predictions of many theoretical models, including Leland and Toft (1998), which argue
that the need to frequently roll-over seasoned debt or renegotiate credit terms limits risk
shifting incentives.
From a statistical viewpoint, the Hausman test reported in the last two rows of Table
2.5 strongly confirms the relevance of the endogeneity issue present in the leverage-risk
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relation.
2.5.2 Robustness
Alternative Econometric Specifications. To gauge robustness of the results with
respect to the econometric model, I also estimate the simultaneous equations specification
given in equations (2.3) and (2.4). Panel A of Table 2.6 displays the leverage coefficients
obtained from this econometric model estimated with three-stage least squares (3SLS),
along with those obtained from a reduced form regression estimated with OLS, and the
2SLS estimates already reported in the previous section. Sign, significance, and magnitude
of the 3SLS estimates are very similar to those obtained from the 2SLS estimation. Again,
the results for long-term leverage are robust across the volatility measures while results for
total debt are mixed.
Alternative Leverage Specifications. In the main regressions presented in Tables 2.4
and 2.5 I have used the two market-based measures of leverage, market leverage (LEV-
MV ) and long-term market leverage (LEV-LT-MV ). Panel B of Table 2.6 also presents
the leverage coefficients for two book-based leverage definitions: book leverage, LEV-BK
and long-term book leverage, LEV-LT-BK. Even though book leverage does not appear
as an explicit argument in contingent claims firm value models, it has the advantage of
being more robust to market fluctuations in equity value, which could simultaneously affect
leverage and volatility and hence lead to spurious results.
The results are qualitatively similar to those obtained with market leverage. In particu-
lar, the main result that the coefficient of long-term leverage, LEV-LT-BK, is positive and
highly significant in the 2SLS and 3SLS regressions remains unchanged and the magnitude
of the coefficient is comparable to the one obtained using market leverage. As for the base
case regressions, the results for total book leverage, LEV-BK, are not robust across the
three proxies for asset volatility.
2.6 Risk Shifting and Corporate Governance
To obtain the main results I have used a relatively parsimonious specification of the asset
volatility equation. However, there likely exist other firm characteristics which influence
risk shifting incentives provided by leverage. An obvious candidate is corporate governance,
or more precisely, the alignment of shareholder and manager interests. Recall that risk
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Table 2.6: Robustness. The table reports estimates of the leverage coefficient for three different econo-
metric models and four different leverage definitions. The first row in panels A and B contains OLS
estimates of a reduced form regression of asset volatility on leverage and control variables. The second row
contains estimates of the equation system (2.1) and (2.2) estimated with 2SLS. The last row shows the
results for the simultaneous equation system (2.3) and (2.4) estimated with 3SLS. The results reported
in Panel A are based on a market-based definition of leverage while those in panel B are based on a
book-based definition. T-statistics are in parentheses.
PANEL A: MARKET-BASED LEVERAGE MEASURES
LEV-MV LEV-LT-MV
BS L LT BS L LT
OLS -0.1883 -0.2124 -0.3974 0.0925 -0.1599 -0.1934
(12.34 ) (-14.79) (-30.18) (5.84) (-10.84) (-13.91)
2SLS -0.1339 -0.1547 0.2434 0.5485 0.3418 0.6971
(-1.69) (-2.11) (3.27) (7.68) (5.07) (10.32)
3SLS -0.1420 -0.1655 0.1968 0.5412 0.3301 0.6731
(-1.80) (-2.26) (2.65) (7.58) (4.91) (10.02)
PANEL B: BOOK-BASED LEVERAGE MEASURES
LEV-BV LEV-LT-BV
BS L LT BS L LT
OLS -0.1725 -0.1829 -0.3157 0.0260 -0.1540 -0.1712
(-13.92) (-15.69) (-29.57) (2.04) (-13.10) (-15.43)
2SLS 0.0391 -0.0224 0.3251 0.5313 0.3332 0.5805
(0.49) (-0.30) (4.17) (8.26) (5.55) (9.61)
3SLS 0.0359 -0.0253 0.3090 0.5346 0.3367 0.5892
(0.45) (-0.34) (3.97) (8.32) (5.62) (9.79)
shifting is shareholder-debtholder conflict. In most public corporations, however, managers,
not shareholders, take operational decisions. Since managers are typically regarded as more
risk averse than shareholders, it is not obvious that the asset substitution conflict should be
reflected in corporate investment decisions. Therefore, the alignment of interests between
shareholders and managers should play an important role affecting the extent to which risk
shifting occurs.
In this section I examine two means which are commonly thought to motivate managers
to act in the interest of shareholders: executive compensation and ownership concentration.
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2.6.1 Executive Compensation
In this section I focus on the risk-taking incentives provided to CEOs through their com-
pensation schemes. Due to their high sensitivity to volatility, stock options arguable play
the prevalent role in incentivizing managers to take higher risks.
I use the ExecuComp database to estimate CEOs’ stock options portfolios following
the procedure proposed by Core and Guay (2002). I compute three proxies for CEOs’
risk-taking incentives provided through their compensation structure. My first measure
is COMPOUND VEGA. COMPOUND VEGA is defined as the sensitivity of the CEO’s
stock and option portfolio with respect to asset volatility. Following the analogy of equity
as a call option on assets, stock options represent a compound option on the assets - an
option on another option. Computing COMPOUND VEGA thus involves the estimation
of the derivative with respect to asset volatility of a compound option. To do this, I use
the compound option model of Geske (1979). As a second proxy, I compute the sensitivity
of CEOs’ option portfolios with respect to equity volatility. I call this variable BLACK-
SCHOLES VEGA. As a third proxy, I simply compute the ratio of the Black-Scholes value
of options granted in a given year, divided by total compensation. I term this variable
OPTION COMPENSATION.
Table 2.7 displays the results for the leverage coefficient of the second stage 2SLS base
case regression. The first row in each panel reports the results for the entire sample with
the required executive compensation data available. I split the sample in two subsamples
based on the median with respect to the incentives measure used. The second row reports
the leverage coefficients for the sample with above median compensation characteristics
while the third row shows the analogous results for the complementary subsample. The
coefficient estimates show that, for all incentive proxies, all leverage specifications and all
asset volatility proxies, the leverage coefficient is higher in the subsamples where CEOs
have above median risk-taking incentives. This suggests an important role for option
compensation in the context of asset substitution.
2.6.2 Ownership Concentration
It it often argued that ownership concentration alleviates misalignment of managers’ and
shareholders interests. In firms which are owned by only a few investors, coordination of
shareholder decisions is much easier, and managers that underperform can be fired more
easily. Regarding risk policy, it is not obvious, however, if higher ownership concentration
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should lead to more pronounced asset substitution. The typical argument, that sharehold-
ers are diversified and therefore willing to take higher risks than undiversified managers,
does not necessarily hold in corporations with large ownership concentration. Investors
that own a sizable fraction of a company are usually not well-diversified, but instead have
a large share of their wealth invested in a specific firm. Hence, risk aversion may play a
role even on the ownership side.
To investigate whether ownership concentration leads to more or less asset substitution,
I construct a proxy for ownership concentration from the data provided by Andrew Metrick
which is described in detail in Dlugosz et al. (2005). OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION is
defined as the fraction of stock owned by all blockholders, where blockholders are investors
with stakes that exceed 5% of a firm’s equity.
Table 2.8 presents the leverage coefficients of the second stage base case regressions
where, as above, results are reported for the entire sample, and above and below median
sample splits. The results in the first row show that, in the entire sample with available
ownership data, leverage coefficients are significantly positive, even for the total debt lever-
age measure. The above and below median subsample analysis indicates that risk shifting
is actually less pronounced when ownership concentration is high. For both leverage mea-
sures and all volatility proxies, risk shifting is less pronounced for firms with above median
ownership concentration. This suggests that capital protection rather than risk taking is
the dominating motive in these firms.
Table 2.8: Risk Shifting and Ownership Concentration. The table presents 2SLS estimates of
the leverage coefficient for different subsamples of the data. The first row contains estimates based on
the entire sample for which the ownership concentration data is available. The second and third row
contain estimates based on subsamples with above and below median values of the respective ownership
concentration characteristics. OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION is defined as the fraction of stock owned
by all blockholders, where blockholders are investors with stakes exceeding 5% of a firm’s equity. Underlying
data are from Dlugosz et al. (2005). T-statistics are in parentheses.
LEV-MV LEV-LT-MV
BS L LT BS L LT
Entire Sample 0.7017 0.7010 1.0909 0.7241 0.6832 1.0014
(3.69) (3.79) (5.02) (4.38) (4.50) (5.75)
Above Median 0.6190 0.6332 0.9095 0.7117 0.6901 0.9614
(2.81) (2.99) (3.84) (3.48) (3.49) (4.49)
Below Median 0.9868 0.9612 1.5914 0.8685 0.7843 1.1936
(2.53) (2.53) (3.23) (2.94) (3.20) (3.80)
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2.7 Risk Shifting and Asset Structure
Besides the corporate governance structure which determines whether shareholders’ incen-
tives are translated into operational decisions, another important aspect is the ability to
increase risk. Even if incentives exist, risk shifting may be constrained, for instance, due to
the nature of the assets the company owns. It is arguable, for instance, that a corporation
with a high proportion of fixed, long-lived assets, is unlikely to increase risk in short time
in response to increased incentives provided by leverage. On the other hand, firms that
hold large amounts of liquid assets, which are typically invested in capital markets, can
more easily restructure their portfolios quickly. Taken literally, asset substitution should
only be feasible if assets are substitutable.
Table 2.9 reports the base case second stage leverage coefficients for the entire sample
and, in addition, two subsamples which are split at the median of three asset characteristics:
asset maturity, the proportion if liquid assets to total assets, and tangible assets ratio.
The results strongly suggest that the composition of assets matters for risk shifting.
In both leverage specifications (LEV-MV in panel A and LEV-LT-MV in panel B) risk
shifting is more pronounced when assets have shorter maturities, when the proportion of
liquid assets is high, and when the proportion of tangible assets is low.
2.8 Conclusion
This paper investigates whether leverage has a causal effect on corporate risk policy. The
evidence suggests that, when the endogeneity of leverage is accounted for, a positive relation
between leverage and asset volatility exists. However, this relation is statistically and
economically significant only for long-term leverage, that is when leverage is defined as
the ratio of long-term debt to total assets or market value. Consistent with theoretical
predictions about the role of debt maturity for risk-shifting incentives (Leland and Toft,
1998; Ju and Ou-Yang, 2005), this implies that long-term debt aggravates while short-term
debt curbs risk-shifting incentives.
Further evidence suggests that the risk-taking incentives provided to management
through incentive compensation as well as the ability to shift operational risks, as deter-
mined by the nature of the assets, are important factors exacerbating the asset substitution
problem.
A main insight of this study is that the causal effect of leverage on firm risk (as identified
with instrumental variables regressions) is positive even though the partial correlation
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between leverage and risk (as obtained from reduced form regressions) is negative. This
suggests that asset risk generally decreases as firms take on higher levels of debt, but that
this decrease is not as strong as it would be without the incentive effect of leverage. A
practical implication of this finding is that creditors should anticipate the incentive effect of
granting loans to their borrowers. Therefore, an interesting question left for future research
is whether this incentive effect is priced in corporate bonds and loans.
Appendix 2.A The Models
2.A.1 The Black/Scholes/Merton Model
Equity value is given by
E(V ) = V e−dTN(d1)− e−rTPN(d2)
where
d1 =
ln(V
P
) + (r − d+ 0.5σ2)T
σ
√
(T )
and
d2 = d1 − σ
√
(T )
2.A.2 The Leland Model
Firm value is given by
v(V ) = V + TB(V )−BC(V )
= V +
τC
r
· [1− V/V −xB ]− αVB[V/VB]−x
where
x =
(r − δ − 0.5σ2) +√(r − δ − 0.5σ2)2 + 2σ2r
σ2
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and
VB =
(1− τ)C
r
x
1 + x
Debt value is given by
D(V ) =
C
r
+
[
(1− α)VB − C/r
][
V/VB
]−x
Hence equity value is
E(V ) = v(V )−D(V )
= V − (1− τ)C/r + [(1− τ)C/r − VB][V/VB]−x
2.A.3 The Leland/Toft Model
Firm value is the same as in Leland(1994). Debt value is given by
D(V ) = C/r + (P − C/r)
[
1− e−rT
rT
− I(T )
]
+
[
(1− α)VB − C/r
]
J(T )
The bankruptcy barrier
VB =
C
r
( A
rT
−B)− AP
rT
− τCx
r
1 + αx− (1− α)B
where
A = (z − a)− 2zN(zσV
√
T ) + 2ae−rTN(aσV
√
T )− 2
σV
√
T
n(zσV
√
T )
+
2e−rT
σV
√
Tn(aσV
√
T )
B = (z − a)− (2z + 2
zσ2T
)N(zσV
√
T ) +
1
zσ2T
− 2
σV
√
T
n(zσV
√
T )
I(T ) =
1
rT
[
G(T )− e−rTF (T )]
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1
zσV
√
T
[
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VB
)−a+z
N(q1(T ))q1(T ) +
( V
VB
)−a−z
N(q2(T ))q2(T )
]
F (t) = N(h1(t)) +
V
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)−2a
N(h2(t))
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(
V
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)z−a
N(q1(t)) +
(
V
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)−z−a
N(q2(t))
and
q1(t) =
−b− zσ2V t
σ
√
t
; q2(t) =
−b+ zσ2V t
σ
√
t
h1(t) =
−b− aσ2V t
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t
; h2(t) =
−b+ aσ2V t
σ
√
t
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r − δ − σ2V
2
σ2V
; b = ln
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)
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√
(aσ2V ) + 2rσ
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3.1 Introduction
This paper investigates the idea that turnover risk is priced in executive compensation.
Our motivation for studying this question is that the willingness of boards to fire CEOs
and executive compensation levels exhibit a strikingly similar development over the past
decades. If CEOs expect contractual compensation agreements, which frequently require
cancelation of unvested equity-based pay in case of turnover, to be rigorously enforced,
the expected value to CEOs of current compensation packages may be significantly lower
than usually assumed. In addition, there may be important career concerns for a CEO
who is fired in that, on average, fired CEOs earn less and manage smaller firms in the
future. To guarantee participation of CEOs, efficient contracts may, therefore, require
rising compensation as turnover risk rises.
In this paper, we provide empirical evidence on the relationship between expected
hazard rates for CEOs, estimated from turnover data, and compensation actually received.
We find a statistically and economically strongly significant turnover risk premium: On
average, a one-percentage point increase in the forced turnover rate goes hand in hand
with a 10 percent increase in compensation, a quite sizable effect. We also show that these
results are unlikely to be driven by reverse causation.
We begin in section 3.2 by presenting some stylized facts on executive pay and forced
turnover. We find that the secular rise of CEO pay occurred hand in hand with a rise in
forced turnover of CEOs. Indeed, forced turnover of CEOs of major U.S. corporations has
increased massively over the past 20 years. While only about 1% of CEOs of major U.S.
companies were fired in 1980, 3%-4% were fired in 2000, and 5% in 2005.
In section 3.3 we propose two channels through which forced turnover and compensation
levels are likely to be linked, and estimate the theoretical effect on the expected value of
compensation that turnover risk generates through these channels. First, forced turnover
can lead to loss of the unvested portions of executive pay. Accounting for this possibility
lowers the expected value of executive pay. Second, forced turnover has adverse labor
market consequences. Typically, fired CEOs earn far less and manage smaller companies
later in their professional lives. Both elements suggest that there may be a turnover risk
premium that varies in the cross-section and across time and that can potentially be an
important determinant of executive compensation levels. Our numerical results for the risk
premium that can be attributed to these monetary consequences of forced turnover reveal
that a one percentage point increase in the forced turnover rate should be compensated
with about 2 to 3 percent more in terms of total compensation.
3.1. INTRODUCTION 61
While, according to our estimates, the mere monetary consequences of turnover appear
to be modest, other personal implications such as loss of seniority or reputation arguably
impose additional costs on CEOs. Thus the total turnover risk premium, as reflected
in compensation actually received, is likely to exceed the purely monetary component.
Estimating this empirical turnover risk premium is the task of section 3.4. We use detailed
turnover and compensation data for the largest U.S. corporations from 1993 to 2001. In a
first step we estimate a hazard rate which the CEO is exogenously exposed to, i.e., which
does not depend on management skill or entrenchment, as it is mainly for this exogenous
part of the hazard rate that the CEO can expect to be compensated for. Consistent with
this idea we estimate hazard rates which are predicted by year, industry affiliation, and
industry performance. This is motivated by a major theme in the recent literature on
CEO turnover, namely, that boards do not appear to filter out industry performance when
judging CEOs (Jenter and Kanaan, 2006).
We not only find these predicted hazard rates to be statistically significantly correlated
with executive compensation levels, we also find substantial economic significance. Our
estimates reveal that for the median CEO a one percentage point increase in firing risk is
associated with about $200,000 more in terms of total compensation. In relative terms this
corresponds to a turnover risk premium of around ten percent for a one percentage point
increase in turnover risk. The effect is twice as large when the pay package was negotiated
for the first time. For first-year CEOs, a one percentage point turnover probability increase
is worth around $400,000 for the median CEO.
Although the theoretical case for a turnover risk premium is plausible, we also explic-
itly address potential endogeneity issues in our empirical analysis. First, we find that in
the years preceding turnover, CEOs who are fired do not earn more than CEOs who leave
voluntarily. This is contrary to a reverse causation explanation where increased turnover
risk results from higher pay because of heightened performance expectations and account-
ability of CEOs. Second, we observe that, following forced turnover, total compensation
sharply increases while the proportion of equity-based pay tends to decrease. Thus, if total
compensation were driven only by the risk inherent in equity-based pay, this would imply
that we should observe lower total compensation following forced turnover. The fact that
we observe higher compensation, therefore, implies that we may underestimate rather than
overestimate, the impact of forced turnover on total compensation.
These findings add to the literature on executive compensation and corporate gover-
nance. Other papers have focused on the role of turnover as an incentive device (Jensen
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and Murphy, 1990; Subramanian et al., 2002; Hallman et al., 2005) and the implications
of termination risk on managerial risk-taking (Chakraborty et al., 2004). In contrast to
these papers, our focus is on the level of pay. Recent theories have intended to show
that the secular rise of executive pay can be explained by the similar increase in firm size
within a framework of competitive markets and rare skills (Gabaix and Landier, 2006) or
a change in the composition of managerial skills needed to manage a corporation (Murphy
and Zaboinik, 2004) or managerial entrenchment (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004). However,
we are not aware of any other study that has tried to draw a causal connection between
forced turnover and executive pay. Our contribution, therefore, is to show that turnover
risk remains a powerful determinant of executive compensation even after controlling for
other factors known to influence pay.
3.2 Executive turnover and executive compensation
We begin by presenting some stylized facts on executive turnover and executive compen-
sation. The suggestive evidence presented in this section provides the motivation for our
theoretical analysis of the link between turnover and compensation and the subsequent
empirical analysis.
3.2.1 CEO compensation
To set the stage, consider Figure 3.1. This graph shows average CEO pay between 1993 and
2005 in the S&P 1500 firms. The levels reflect much of the unease that many commentators
have with the development of executive compensation: a dramatic increase in the level of
executive pay. But besides this, other aspects are noteworthy: First, after 2000 average
CEO pay has actually declined for a few years to rise again only after 2003. Second, also
following 2000, the composition of CEO pay has changed substantially. Bonuses (immediate
cash rewards) have become much more important recently, while the share of equity-based
pay (deferred rewards) in CEOs’ compensation packages has decreased.
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Figure 3.1: Average compensation of S&P 1500 CEOs. The figure shows the average compensation
of S&P 1500 CEOs over the period 1993-2005. Pay levels are converted to 2005 dollars using the consumer
price index provided by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Source: ExecuComp
3.2.2 CEO turnover
We use data from four recent studies (Dezso¨, 2006; Huson et al., 2001; Jenter and Kanaan,
2006; Booz-Allen-Hamilton, 2005) to explore the actual extent of forced turnover.1 Dezso¨
(2006) extends the Huson et al. (2001) data set on CEO turnover and we refer to the
extended data set as DHPS, and to the other studies as JK, and BAH, respectively. Iden-
tifying a turnover as ”forced” is not obvious, and requires careful hand-collection of data.2
While the data sets differ in the details, Figures 3.2-3.4 all tell the same basic story:
1The Booz-Allen-Hamilton study provides aggregated turnover data only. It is, however, the only study
that covers the period after 2001, and we use all data available at this point. Acquiring detailed data on
forced CEO turnover in S&P 1500 firms after 2001 is part of our ongoing efforts.
2Therefore, we are extremely grateful to the cited authors for providing us with the data. The
methodology of the first three cited studies follows Parrino (1997). All departures for which the press
reports state that the CEO is fired, forced out, or retires or resigns due to policy differences or pressure,
are classified as forced. Turnovers of CEOs below the age of 60 which have not been classified as forced by
the press criterion, are classified as forced if the articles do not report the reason to be death, poor health,
or acceptance of another position or the articles report that the CEO is retiring but does not announce
the retirement date at least 6 months before the succession. For further details, see the original papers.
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Figure 3.2: Turnover rates for CEOs in the ExecuComp database. The figure shows turnover
rates for CEOs in the ExecuComp database over the period 1992-2001. Underlying data are from Jenter
and Kanaan (2006)
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Figure 3.3: Turnover rates for CEOs of the Fortune 800 firms. The figure shows turnover rates
for CEOs of the Fortune 800 firms over the period 1975-2000. Underlying data are from Huson et al.
(2001) and Dezso¨ (2006)
3.2. EXECUTIVE TURNOVER AND EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 65
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
Year
Tu
rn
ov
er
 R
at
e 
[%
]
Total Turnover
Forced Turnover
Figure 3.4: Turnover rates for CEOs of U.S. firms among the largest 2500 firms worldwide.
The figure shows turnover rates for CEOs of U.S. firms among the largest 2500 firms worldwide over the
period 1995-2005. Underlying data are from Booz-Allen-Hamilton (2005). We interpolate linearly for
years not available in the original data (1996, 1997, and 1999).
There has been a secular rise in forced turnover rates. The increase has become especially
salient in the 1990s, with the evidence suggesting that nowadays a 4% to 5% chance of
forced CEO turnover per year is not unusual for the largest U.S. corporations. Although
substantially lower than voluntary turnover, this nonetheless represents a significant threat,
especially when considering the involuntary turnover risk a CEO faces over his entire
prospected tenure. For a newly hired CEO the yearly turnover probabilities imply a 25%
to 30% probability of getting fired during a 7-year tenure.
Another interesting feature is that the BAH data show a decrease in turnover after
2000, before it rises again; executive pay shows a similar pattern. Combining the data on
executive turnover and compensation suggests that the two may be connected: Indeed, the
raw correlations between median CEO pay and forced turnover for the DHPS, JK, and
BAH data, respectively, are 0.45, 0.76, and 0.88. By contrast, the correlations between
median CEO pay and voluntary turnover in the three datasets are much lower, -0.29, 0.22,
and 0.02, respectively. While this is at most suggestive evidence as it relies on only a few
data points it motivates us to explore a possible causal relation between forced turnover
and compensation in more detail.
The non-monotonic pattern of CEO pay after 2000 is, indeed, a feature that may allow
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us to re-evaluate many of the arguments that have been advanced in explaining the level
and trend in executive pay. Recent theories have intended to show that the secular rise
of executive pay can be explained by the similar increase in firm size within a framework
of competitive markets and rare skills (Gabaix and Landier, 2006) or a change in the
composition of managerial skills needed to manage a corporation (Murphy and Zaboinik,
2004). Other authors have advocated the managerial entrenchment view in explaining
excessive executive pay (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004). It is clear, however, that these theories
have difficulties explaining the non-monotonic evolution of CEO pay in recent years.
On the other hand, some observers have argued that total compensation may to a large
extent be driven by stock market valuations (Hall and Murphy, 2003), as a significant
share of CEO pay is equity-based. This would explain not only the general rise but also
the non-monotonic pattern of CEO pay in the years following the burst of the dot-com
bubble. A skill-related explanation in the spirit of (Gabaix and Landier, 2006) would also
be consistent with this pattern if market capitalization is used as a proxy for firm size.
While stock market valuation is certainly an important determinant of CEO pay, we show
in our empirical section below that forced turnover risk is a highly significant determinant
of total compensation even after controlling for market value, whether in the time-series
or the cross-section.
3.3 The link between turnover and compensation
The basic conclusion we draw from these facts is that while CEOs have undoubtedly been
able to secure a dramatic increase in pay, they are also facing increasing risk of involuntary
turnover. There are at least two powerful reasons why a greater probability of forced
turnover may be associated with greater pay levels. First, a CEO may lose the unvested
portion of his equity-based pay in case of forced turnover. Accounting for this possibility
reduces the expected value of CEO pay. This channel links turnover risk and compensation
through concerns about the impact of forced turnover on compensation received in the past.
Second, forced turnover may have severe consequences for CEOs’ employment and earnings
opportunities later in their professional lives. Hence, CEOs may be compensated for the
expected negative earnings impact of turnover risk, in particular if turnover occurs for
reasons largely outside the CEOs control, such as an industry decline. This second channel
links turnover risk and compensation through career concerns, i.e. concerns about future
earnings opportunities.
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We begin by sketching a model which explicitly accounts for the first channel generating
a turnover risk premium, the forfeiture of past unvested compensation, and apply our
valuation model to actual compensation packages of S&P1500 CEOs. Our results show
that forfeiture risk can explain only a small part of the evolution of CEO pay. We then
investigate the second channel, concerns about diminished earnings opportunities following
turnover. To this end, we develop a simple model which approximates the discount to
current compensation due to turnover-induced monetary career concerns. Applying the
model to a realistic range of parameters, we find that monetary career concerns can explain
much higher turnover risk premia than forfeiture.
3.3.1 The forfeiture risk premium
While some companies require the cancelation of unvested equity-based pay only in case
of voluntary departure, most equity compensation plans do not distinguish between forced
and voluntary turnover. Instead, they contain general formulations requiring forfeiture
of unvested stocks and options when the employment terminates (without specifying the
reason). Other compensation plans explicitly provide for cancelation in case of forced
turnover.3 Of course, in case of forced CEO turnover, severance agreements may in some
cases compensate for the forfeiture of unvested stocks and options, either through lump-
sum payments or by waiving forfeiture rules altogether. However, Rusticus (2006), Dahiya
and Yermack (2007), and Sletten and Lys (2006) show that CEOs can in general expect
only relatively small amounts of severance to be contractually guaranteed.4 The biggest
portion of severance payments, thus, is discretionary. Arguably, CEOs cannot, ex ante,
count on these deviations from contractual agreements, especially in times when they face
stronger and more assertive boards and active shareholders.
To estimate an upper bound for the discount to executive compensation of forfeiture
risk, we assume that contractual provisions require cancelation of unvested equity-based
pay and immediate exercise of vested equity-pay components. We use the certainty-
equivalent approach in the spirit of Lambert et al. (1991) and Hall and Murphy (2002), but
adjust for the possibility of cancelation and accelerated exercise of unvested options and
3For example, Viacom’s 2006 long-term management incentive plan states that ”[...] in the
event that [...] the Participant ceases to be an employee of the Company by reason of the
voluntary termination by the Participant or the termination by the Company [...] all rights
with respect to Stock Options that are not vested as of such event will be relinquished” (see
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1339947/000119312507086534/ddef14a.htm)
4While only about 50% of CEOs’ employment agreements contain an explicit severance provision, the
median contracted amount of severance is only about 2 to 3 times base salary and bonus.
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stocks. In the following we use the term ”subjective value” synonymous with ”certainty
equivalent value” to highlight the feature that the certainty equivalent approach accounts
for individual preferences, endowment and portfolio diversification of the executive. For
brevity of exposition we discuss only the main aspects of the model in the main body of
the paper. The details of the derivations are relegated to the appendix.
We define the random time TF as the time the CEO is forced out of office and assume
a constant hazard rate of forced turnover with density function fTF :
5
fTF (t) = λe
−λt t ∈ [0,∞), (3.1)
where λ is the hazard rate.
We consider the payoffs from option and stock grants separately. First, consider the
payoff of an option grant.6 We use the following notation: 1TF<TV ∧TR is an indicator
variable that is equal to 1 if the condition in the subscript holds. For example, in this case
the variable is 1 if the CEO is forced out at a date before his options are vested and before
he retires. The CEO’s wealth at time T from the option grant is then given by
WOT = 1TF<TV ∧TR · 0 + 1TF≥TV ∧TR1TF<TR∧T · n[PTF −X]+er(T−TF ) + 1TF≥TR∧T · n[PT −X]+
= 1TF≥TV ∧TR1TF<TR∧T · n[PTF −X]+er(T−TF ) + 1TF≥TR∧T · n[PT −X]+ (3.2)
where PTF and PT are the stock prices at TF and T , respectively, n is the number of options
in the grant, X is the strike price, and r is the risk-free rate. The first term indicates the
event that the CEO is fired before the options vest and before he retires in which case
the payoff is zero. The second term indicates the event that the CEO is fired between the
vesting date and the smaller of his retirement and the option’s expiry date. This is the case
5One can, in principle, accommodate the feature that the probability of forced turnover, conditional
on survival, depends on factors such as time, industry performance, and firm performance by specifying
the hazard rate as a function of a set of these variables. In the empirical section, we use time- and
industry-specific hazard rates.
6We consider European options in our main analysis. This assumption is restrictive and does not,
in particular, allow for the empirically documented early exercise of executive stock options (except for
involuntary exercise of vested options in the event of turnover). By doing so, we retain tractability and
intuition of the model relative to American option valuation which necessarily relies on simulation (see
Carpenter (1998), Carpenter (2000) and Ingersoll (2006) for an analysis of subjective values of American
style options). In any case, the differential effect of turnover/cancelation on European and American
option values is likely to be negligible as cancelation occurs in the vesting period when the option cannot
be exercised anyway.
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of accelerated exercise in which the payoff of a single option is [PTF − X]+, the intrinsic
value at departure. We assume that the CEO receives this payoff in cash and invests it in
the risk-free asset until T . The third term represents the case when the CEO remains in
office until regular retirement or option maturity. In this case he gets the intrinsic value of
the option at time T .
Analogously, the CEO’s payoff from his restricted stock grant is given by
W ST = 1TF<TV ∧TR · 0 + 1TF≥TV ∧TR1TF<TR∧T · sPTF er(T−TF ) + 1TF≥TR∧T · sPT
= 1TF≥TV ∧TR1TF<TR∧T · sPTF er(T−TF ) + 1TF≥TR∧T · sPT (3.3)
where the first term refers to the event that the CEO is dismissed before vesting and retire-
ment, in which case the payoff is zero, and the second term indicates the complementary
event, in which case the CEO gets the full value of his stock grant at TF . As with the
option payoff at TF , we again assume that the stock is sold and the proceeds are invested
in the risk-free asset.
Assuming that the CEO has outside wealth W0 invested at the risk-free rate, r, his
total wealth at time T is
WT = W0e
rT +WOT +W
S
T (3.4)
If instead of the risky, equity-based compensation the CEO were awarded the amount
C in riskless cash, his wealth at time T is given by
WCT = (W0 + C)e
rT (3.5)
The certainty equivalent value of the CEO’s entire package of equity-based compen-
sation is defined as the amount C∗ that equates expected utilities of equations (3.4) and
(3.5).
Figure 3.5 shows certainty equivalent values for options with typical characteristics and
assuming a range of different hazard rates. The two panels in figure 3.5 also illustrate
the sensitivity of the certainty equivalent value with respect to volatility. In Panel A we
use a volatility of 41%, the median volatility in 2000. Panel B shows option values when
assuming a volatility of 29%, the average volatility over the period 1993-2005. The graphs
indicate that the discount due to forfeiture can be large potentially, but relative to certainty
equivalent values without forfeiture risk the discount is sizable only when volatility is low.
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Intuitively, this is because the two sources of risk are complementary. When volatility
is large, certainty equivalent values are depressed so much that the additional effect of
cancelation becomes negligible. Forfeiture risk has important valuation effects only when
volatility is low, so that certainty equivalent values without forfeiture risk are close very
to Black-Scholes values.
In order to estimate the potential impact of forfeiture risk on executive compensation
packages we adapt our methodology to account for the different components of pay (salary,
bonus, restricted stock and options). The technical details are given in the appendix. We
assume a hazard rate equal to the average empirical forced turnover rate in a given year.
These empirical turnover rates are taken from Jenter and Kanaan (2006) for 1993-2001
and from Booz-Allen-Hamilton (2005) for 2002-2005.
Figure 3.6 illustrates the results. The bar heights correspond to the mean risk-neutrally
valued CEO pay, while the solid and dotted lines correspond to certainty equivalent values,
with and without account for forfeiture risk, and assuming relative risk aversion of ρ = 2.
The striking feature is that subjective values of CEO compensation packages accounting
for turnover risk are not predicted to be substantially below those without turnover for
most of the sample period. The sources of this result are two-fold: First, turnover discounts
to total compensation are much smaller than those pertaining to stock options or restricted
stock only, as the non-deferred part of compensation is unaffected by turnover. Second,
certainty equivalent values of options are very sensitive to volatility. Thus, in the years 1998
to 2000, when turnover rates were rising substantially, their effect on turnover-adjusted
subjective values is negligible, primarily because the increase in stock return volatility
dominates the turnover effect. Forfeiture risk has a noticeable effect only in the latest
years in the sample when turnover rates are high and volatility is low. In 2005, forfeiture
risk depresses mean subjective values of CEO pay by about $300,000. Given a turnover
hazard rate of 5% in that year, this implies about a $60,000 decrease in terms of total
certainty equivalent compensation for a 1% increase in turnover risk. Over the entire
sample period the effect is much smaller, however.
In sum, our numerical results suggest that forfeiture risk cannot account for a significant
part of the development of CEO pay levels. A one percentage point increase in turnover
risk for a typical CEO is likely to be associated with a decrease in the certainty equivalent
of compensation from his present job on the order of $20,000 to $40,000, or one half to one
percent of total risk-neutral compensation. This is only a tiny fraction of the turnover risk
premium we estimate from the data in our empirical section below.
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Figure 3.5: Executive option values. Executive values for 10-year options with an exercise price of $30
are estimated using the certainty equivalence approach. Certainty equivalents are computed numerically
assuming the executive has constant relative risk aversion, ρ = 2, safe wealth, W0, equal to the greater of
$5 million and four times total compensation, and the fraction α of total wealth invested in company stock.
Stock returns are assumed to be lognormally distributed with mean µ = rf + β(rm − rf ) according to the
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), and volatility σ. The parameters rf = 5%, β = 0.96, and α = 37%
are chosen as the median values of S&P500 firms/CEOs, 1993-2005. The vesting period is assumed to be
2.5 years, consistent with a straight vesting schedule over five years where 20% of options vest each year.
The simulations shown in Panel A are based on σ = 41%, the median volatility in 2000, which is also the
highest in the sample period. Panel B uses σ = 29%, the median volatility over the entire sample period
1993-2005.
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Figure 3.6: Risk-neutral and risk-adjusted CEO pay for S&P 1500 firms. The figure displays
the mean risk-neutral and risk-adjusted CEO pay for S&P 1500 firms in constant 2005 dollars, 1993-
2005. Total risk-neutral compensation is indicated by bar height. Executive (subjective) values without
forfeiture risk are given by the dashed line. Subjective values accounting for forfeiture risk are given by
the solid line. The percentage value below the years gives the median annualized stock return volatility
calculated from monthly data over 48 months. Subjective values of compensation are estimated using the
certainty equivalence approach and are defined as the amount of safe cash the CEO would be indifferent to
exchanging for his risky compensation package. Certainty equivalents are computed numerically assuming
the CEO has constant relative risk aversion of 2. The CEO’s non-firm-related safe wealth is assumed to
be the greater of $5 million and four times total compensation. Stock returns are assumed to be normally
distributed with mean rf + β · (rm − rf ) and volatility σ. β and σ are estimated using monthly stock and
CRSP value-weighted index returns over 48 months. rf is the yield of 1-year U.S. Treasury Bills. The
equity premium (rm − rf ) is assumed to be 6.5%. To calculate subjective values with forfeiture risk we
assume a vesting period (for restricted stock and options) of 2.5 years, consistent with the average vesting
period implied by a straight vesting schedule over five years where 20% of securities vest each year. The
time to regular retirement is given by the greater of zero and 65 less the CEO’s age.
3.3.2 Risk premia due to career concerns
Getting fired may, of course, have far more detrimental consequences to a CEO than the
potential loss of some of his past compensation. Indeed, it may imply a substantial loss
of future employment opportunities and compensation. Fee and Hadlock (2004) provide
intriguing evidence that this ought to be a major concern for CEOs. They find that (1)
in three quarters of cases of turnovers (even voluntary ones), new salaries are lower than
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old salaries, (2) only a third of CEOs who were fired reappear at other employers in their
sample, (3) those who do obtain new employment after having been fired do so at firms
approximately one-tenth the size of their former employer, and that (4) those for whom
salary data is available (and who are, therefore, likely to have gotten the best new jobs),
experience pay cuts on the order of 20%.
While the 20% pay loss arguably understates the average earnings consequences of
forced turnover, Fee and Hadlock’s findings on the size of subsequent employers allows one
to obtain a second approximate benchmark. We can translate the decrease in firms size by
a factor of ten into the corresponding pay reduction using the coefficient of log firm size in
a regression of log total compensation on firm size (and control variables). Consistent with
other studies on CEO compensation, we find this coefficient to be approximately 0.40 (see
empirical section below). This implies that a ten-fold decrease in firm size is associated
with a 4-fold decrease in pay. In other words, a dismissed CEO is likely to earn about
one quarter of his pre-turnover pay, or incur a 75% pay loss. Note that both the 20% and
75% estimates are conditional on the CEO finding a new employer at all. Altogether this
suggests that an expected pay reduction of 50% or more is not unreasonable.
In order to estimate the turnover discount to CEO compensation due to the risk of
future pay loss, we develop a simple model which retains a certainty equivalent intuition
similar to the one described in section 3.3.1 above. Our aim is to compute the value of safe
compensation, paid in full until retirement, which yields the same expected lifetime income
as the compensation actually received, which may be subject to future pay reductions if
turnover occurs. In other words, the certainty equivalent computed in this way answers
the following question: What is the CEO’s current compensation worth adjusting for the
fact that the turnover risk associated with his current job may imply severe reductions of
future pay?
In comparison to the certainty equivalent approach presented in the last section, the
model presented here differs in two important aspects. First, as we want to value the
cumulative monetary consequences of pay losses that may occur in the future, we need
to use the concept of lifetime labor income. To do this, we have to make assumptions
about the evolution of CEO pay in the future with and without turnover. We assume,
for simplicity that the CEO is paid an amount equal to his current compensation until
retirement if he is not fired. If he is fired at some point between the current year and
retirement he will incur a reduction in pay in the amount D in the years following turnover.
The assumption of constant pay is not critical as the certainty equivalents are unchanged
74 CHAPTER 3. THE EXECUTIVE TURNOVER RISK PREMIUM
if we assume a constant growth rate of income instead. Second, we assume that CEOs are
risk-neutral. This simplifies calculations significantly since present values are calculated
as simple discounted expectations of future pay. A certainty equivalent framework akin
to the one used in the previous section would require a range of additional assumptions
regarding the composition of future pay, and other parameters such as future stock prices
and volatilities.
Wealth losses. We begin by modeling present values of turnover-induced wealth losses.
Let Wt denote the compensation a CEO would receive in year t in the future in case he has
not been fired before. Further, assume that, if the CEO is fired, he incurs a pay reduction
in the amount of D in the years following his dismission. Then W˜t = Wt−D ·1(TF<t) is the
”turnover-risky” compensation in year t in the future, where 1(TF<t) is an indicator equal to
one if the CEO has been fired before t and zero otherwise. In a risk-neutral framework the
present value of expected future lifetime income is given by the expected discounted value
of the risky compensation stream W˜t over t = 1, 2, ..., TR, where TR denotes the number of
years until retirement:
E[W+] = E[
TR∑
t=1
e−γtW˜t] =
TR∑
t=1
e−γt(Wt −D · P [TF < t]) (3.6)
where the subscript ”+” indicates that only future compensation is taken into account
when calculating the present value of pay, and γ is the discount factor.
The wealth loss due to turnover risk is given by
E[L+] =
TR∑
t=1
e−γtD · P [TF < t] (3.7)
which can also be written as
E[L+] =
TR−1∑
t=0
L(t)P [TF = t] (3.8)
where L(t) =
∑TR
i=t+1 e
−γiD is the present value of the life time pay loss conditional on
being fired in year t.
Certainty equivalents. We define the certainty equivalent of compensation as that
amount of (turnover-) safe pay which yields a present value of future life time income
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equal to the (turnover-) risky pay. The present value of the turnover-safe compensation
paying cash amount C in every year until retirement is
E[WC+ ] = C ·
TR∑
t=1
e−γt (3.9)
The certainty equivalent of turnover-risky compensation is the safe pay C∗ which solves
E[
TR∑
t=1
e−γtW˜t] = C∗ ·
TR∑
t=1
e−γt (3.10)
so that the certainty equivalent can be computed in closed form as
C∗ =
E[
∑TR
t=1 e
−γtW˜t]∑TR
t=1 e
−γt (3.11)
Table 3.1 shows the percentage difference between the actual compensation, W˜t, which
is subject to turnover risk, and the certainty equivalent of compensation obtained from
equation (3.11) for a range of parameter values. This percentage difference can be inter-
preted as the discount to current compensation due monetary career concerns. Panel A
contains the results assuming 5 years to retirement, while Panels B and C report esti-
mates assuming the CEO is 10 and 15 years from retirement, respectively. These numbers
correspond to the 25%, 50% and 75% quantiles of the age distribution in our sample of
ExecuComp CEOs assuming a retirement age of 65.
The discounts increase with the turnover rate and the assumed pay cut following dis-
mission. They also rise with the length of the CEO’s prospective career. Intuitively, this
captures the idea that CEOs near retirement have little to lose should they be fired whereas
young executives may have to cope with the adverse consequences of forced turnover for
a long time. While the direction of the effects of turnover rate, pay cuts, and years to
retirement is obvious by construction of the model, the main interest lies in the magnitude
of these effects. For the typical CEO who has 10 years to retirement, and assuming his
earnings opportunities would be reduced by 50% if he is fired, an increase in the turnover
rate from 1% to 5% (which roughly equals the rise in turnover risk from 1993 to 2000)
would result in a 7% discount to his compensation. In other words, to keep the CEO
indifferent, a 7% increases in pay would be required to compensate him for 4 percentage
points more turnover risk. This corresponds to a 1.8% increase in pay for a one percentage
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Table 3.1: Discounts due to turnover-induced future pay loss. The table displays the percentage
difference between actual pay, W˜t, which is subject to turnover risk, and the safe amount of pay, C∗, which
yields the same expected present value of lifetime income.
PANEL A: 5 years to retirement
Turnover Pay loss following turnover
rate 25% 50% 75%
1% 0.47 0.94 1.41
2% 0.93 1.86 2.80
3% 1.38 2.77 4.15
4% 1.83 3.65 5.48
5% 2.26 4.52 6.79
PANEL B: 10 years to retirement
Turnover Pay loss following turnover
rate 25% 50% 75%
1% 1.00 1.99 2.99
2% 1.94 3.89 5.83
3% 2.84 5.69 8.53
4% 3.70 7.40 11.10
5% 4.51 9.03 13.54
PANEL C: 15 years to retirement
Turnover Pay loss following turnover
rate 25% 50% 75%
1% 1.46 2.92 4.38
2% 2.81 5.61 8.42
3% 4.05 8.10 12.15
4% 5.20 10.40 15.60
5% 6.26 12.52 18.78
point increase in forced turnover risk.
Combining the impact of turnover-induced pay losses due to forfeiture of past com-
pensation and reductions in future earnings opportunities suggests that one should expect
CEOs to be compensated with about 2-3 percent in terms of total pay for a one percentage
point increase in turnover risk. Of course, these estimates merely account for the potential
monetary sanctions of forced turnover. Other personal implications such as loss of seniority
or reputation are likely to impose additional costs on CEOs. Estimating the total turnover
risk premium is the task of the empirical analysis.
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3.4 The empirical relationship between turnover risk
and executive compensation
The discussion in the previous section indicates that turnover can imply an economically
significant cost for CEOs. If compensation contracts need to obey a participation con-
straint, this suggests that increased turnover risk should go hand in hand with increased
levels of executive compensation, both in the time series and in the cross section. In this
section, we test this prediction. We begin by describing the data. We then turn to the
estimation of hazard rates for CEOs, which are the key explanatory variable in our com-
pensation regressions. Then we present our primary results. Finally, we investigate the
causality issue in the turnover risk - compensation relation.
3.4.1 Data
We use the Jenter and Kanaan (2006) database on CEO turnover which covers the period
1993 to 2001. In terms of numbers of companies covered, the Jenter and Kanaan database
is the most extensive source on CEO turnover available to date, covering the entire Exe-
cuComp universe of firms from 1993 to 2001.7 From 1993 on ExecuComp covers nearly all
S&P1500 companies. The Jenter and Kanaan data includes 1,590 CEO turnovers of which
384 are classified as forced. We merge the Jenter and Kanaan data on CEO turnover with
ExecuComp from which we obtain compensation and some basic balance sheet data, and
with the CRSP database from which we obtain stock returns and volatilities. To obtain a
set of corporate governance variables we then merge the resulting sample with the IRRC
directors database. The final sample used in the main compensation regressions has 10,216
CEO-year observations with non-missing data on compensation, balance-sheet variables,
stock returns and volatilities. Since IRRC data is available only starting in 1996, regres-
sions including corporate governance variables and CEO characteristics are based on 5,803
CEO-year observations. While our results are robust to the inclusion of all observations
with complete data, for our main analysis we exclude CEO-year observations with total
compensation in the top and bottom percentile to reduce outlier problems. We also re-
strict to non-owner CEOs, which we define as CEOs with ownership stakes below 10%.
This excludes about 10% of CEO-years in our sample. The reason is that the hazard rates
we estimate below are unlikely to hold for owner-CEOs as these executives are virtually
7Unfortunately, detailed turnover data is not yet available to us beyond 2001, but acquiring this data
is part of our ongoing efforts.
78 CHAPTER 3. THE EXECUTIVE TURNOVER RISK PREMIUM
never fired.8 Descriptive statistics are given in Table 3.2.
3.4.2 Estimating turnover risk
Our initial motivation for this study was based on the stylized fact that average CEO pay
and turnover frequencies are correlated over time (see Section 3.2). In order to extend our
analysis of the empirical relationship between turnover risk and compensation to the cross
section, we need a turnover measure that varies across CEOs. We use a Probit model to
estimate empirical hazard rates. Predicted values from a Probit model are equivalent to
hazard rates, as they implicitly condition on the CEO being in office in year t− 1. In the
next subsection we demonstrate this equivalence formally. We then proceed to describe and
justify the determinants of the exogenous hazard rate and present our estimation results.
A Probit model for the hazard rate. We begin by briefly outlining our empirical
approach to modeling the turnover hazard rate. Let TF denote the time of forced CEO
turnover. The hazard rate, h(t), can be interpreted as the instantaneous probability (per
time unit) that the CEO is fired, conditional on his survival up to time t. It is defined as
h(t) = lim
∆t→0
1
∆t
P [t < TF ≤ t+∆t|TF > t]
= lim
∆t→0
1
∆t
P [t < TF ≤ t+∆t]
P [TF > t]
=
f(t)
1− F (t) (3.12)
It is constant and equal to λ for the exponential distribution function. Less formally,
h(t)∆t gives the probability that a CEO is fired during the period ∆t given he is in office
at time t.
To obtain CEO-specific hazard rates we use the predicted values from a Probit regres-
sion model, where the dependent variable is the turnover dummy. The turnover dummy,
Dit, where i denotes the company and t the year, is defined as follows: it takes the value
of one if the CEO of firm i is no longer in office at the end of fiscal year t+ 1, conditional
on being in office at the end of fiscal year t. It is zero if he remains in office throughout
fiscal year t + 1. Thus, just as the hazard rate, the turnover indicator conditions on the
CEO’s survival up to time t. The Probit model can then be stated as
E[Dit|xit] = P [Dit = 1|xit] = P [t < TF ≤ t+ 1|TF > t, xit] = Φ(β′xit) (3.13)
8Only one CEO with an ownership stake of above 10% is classified as fired in the Jenter-Kanaan sample.
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Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics. The table displays descriptive statistics for the ExecuComp sample
of firms from 1993 to 2001. Panel A contains turnover statistics from (Jenter and Kanaan, 2006). Panel
B contains basic firm characteristics. Panel C contains CEO compensation variables. The numbers in
brackets refer to the the subsample which excludes the top and bottom 1% of total compensation as well
as CEOs with an ownership stake above 10%. Corporate governance variables are given in Panel D and are
from IRRC. The sample size for the corporate governance variables is smaller than that of compensation
and firm characteristics since IRRC records start only in 1996.
PANEL A: Frequency of Forced and Voluntary Turnover
% of Firms % of Firms
% of Firms with >= 1 with >= 1
with >= 1 Forced Voluntary
# Forced #Voluntary Turnovers Turnovers Turnovers
# Firm years Turnovers Turnovers per Year per Year per Year
15798 384 1206 9.47% 2.36% 7.47%
PANEL B: Firm Characteristics
Mean Median Std N
Sales ($m) 3860 1044 10518 13596
Total Assets($m) 8981 1225 37239 13596
ROA(%) 2.90 4.17 17.67 13596
Volatility(%) 39.61 34.80 20.55 13596
PANEL C: CEO Compensation Characteristics
Mean Median Std N
Total Compensation($1000) 4607 2044 13758 11619
[3838] [2148] [4801] [10216]
Salary($1000) 637 581 341 11669
[645] [593] [326] [10253]
Bonus($1000) 676 347 1730 11669
[646] [366] [1052] [10253]
BSM Option Value($1000) 2510 566 11110 11619
[1883] [625] [3576] [10213]
Value of Restricted Stock($1000) 368 0 6556 11669
[278] [0] [1120] [10253]
Other Compensation($1000) 414 54 1839 11669
[383] [58] [1161] [10253]
Percentage of Equity-based Pay 38 37 29 11595
[39] [39] [29] [10213]
PANEL D: Corporate Governance Variables
Mean Median Std N
Board size 9.82 9 3.17 7513
CEO is Chairman 0.64 1 0.48 7513
Percentage of Independent Directors 62.19 64.29 18.31 7513
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where xit is a vector of explanatory variables, β is the coefficient vector, and Φ denotes the
normal probability distribution function. Predicted values of this regression are estimates
of 1-year firing probabilities conditional on survival up to year t:
hˆ1yr(t) = E[Dit|xit, βˆ] = 0 · (1− Φ(βˆ′xit)) + 1 · Φ(βˆ′xit) = Φ(βˆ′xit) (3.14)
This is formally equivalent to the theoretical 1-year firing probability given by
h1yr(t) = P [t < TF ≤ t+ 1|TF > t] =
∫ t+1
t
f(t)dt
1− F (t) = 1− e
−λ −−→
λ→0
λ (3.15)
To obtain the instantaneous, predicted hazard rate, λˆ, we transform the fitted values from
the Probit regression into λˆ = − log(1− hˆ1yr(t)).
Determinants of the exogenous hazard rate. In estimating hazard rates empirically
we explicitly account for the potential endogeneity of turnover risk to CEO skill. Endo-
geneity bias arises when turnover risk is correlated with CEO skill, which, at the same
time, determines compensation. More specifically, if CEO skill is negatively correlated
with the turnover probability and positively correlated with compensation, the estimated
effect of the hazard rate on CEO pay will be biased downward.
To control for this type of endogeneity we instrument the hazard rate with variables
unrelated to CEO skill. We use two specifications to estimate exogenous hazard rates. In
Model 1 we use industry and year dummies only. In Model 2 we also include industry
performance. This is motivated by the recent literature on CEO turnover which suggests
that industry-induced performance is a significant determinant of turnover.
Note that we deviate from the existing literature on executive turnover which largely
focuses on relative performance sensitivity (Huson et al., 2001; Jenter and Kanaan, 2006;
Kaplan and Minton, 2006). These studies are interested in the sensitivity of both id-
iosyncratic and industry- or market-induced performance on turnover probabilities. In this
study we explicitly exclude idiosyncratic performance from the Probit regression specifica-
tion. This is because hazard rates predicted by idiosyncratic performance would inversely
proxy for CEO skill. Such hazard rates should be less positively related to CEO pay, be-
cause the relation would pick up both the compensation for exogenous turnover risk and
the penalty due to poor skill. On the other hand, hazard rates predicted by exogenous fac-
tors only, such as industry group affiliation or industry performance, would indeed justify
high pay as they represent an a priori greater risk exposure of the CEO.
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Estimated hazard rates. Table 3.3 presents the results for the Probit regressions. The
results for model 1, which uses industry and year dummies only, show that the Finance
sector exhibits the lowest firing probability, followed by the Utilities and the Manufacturing
& Energy sectors while turnover risk is highest in the High Tech sector. Interestingly, the
High Tech sector is also the one with the highest average CEO compensation over the
sample period while in the Utilities sector CEO pay is the lowest. (We conduct the main
analysis including all sectors, but the results are robust to the exclusion of utilities and
financials.)
The results from Model 2, which adds current-year and lagged industry returns, show
a significant relation between forced turnover and industry performance suggesting that
boards do not completely filter out industry-induced performance in their firing decision.
As pointed out before, we explicitly omit idiosyncratic performance in the Probit regres-
sions in order to obtain hazard rates which are unrelated to CEO skill. Even though
idiosyncratic performance is highly significant in this regression, omission does not bias
the coefficient estimates of the other regressors as idiosyncratic performance is, by defini-
tion, orthogonal to industry performance, industry and year dummies.
Table 3.4 illustrates the distributions of the predicted hazard rates across the sample
years. The variation in hazard rates across industries is quite substantial. For instance,
when using model 1, in 2000 CEOs in the High Tech sector were subject to a hazard rate of
6.35% while only 1.93% of CEOs in the Utilities and Finance sectors were fired. As shown
in Panel B, the spread between the 5% and 95% quantile is even larger when industry
performance is added to the Probit specification.
The large cross-sectional variation of hazard rates evident from Table 3.4 provides a
strong source of identification and thus allows us to examine the link between turnover risk
and compensation in a cross sectional and panel setting.
3.4.3 Turnover risk and compensation
Main Results. Table 3.5 presents our primary empirical results. The results first indicate
that the basic control variables have the expected signs: Current and lagged stock return is
positively correlated with pay, CEOs of larger firms earn more, and compensation is higher
when volatility is higher.
The key result for our purposes is that the predicted hazard rate for CEOs is strongly
positively correlated with total compensation: The results suggest that a one percentage
point increase in the hazard rate is associated with about 10% more in terms of total com-
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Table 3.3: Probit regressions of forced CEO turnover. This table displays Probit regressions
estimating the probability of forced turnover. The table reports the marginal probabilities expressed
in percent. Industry dummies are defined according to the Fama/French industry classification for five
industry groups, extended to include Finance and Utilities as separate groups. The omitted industry is
”Cnsmr: Consumer Durables, NonDurables, Wholesale, Retail, and Some Services (Laundries, Repair
Shops)”. Industry returns are median returns of the corresponding industry group according to the (Fama
and French, 1997) classification, and are expressed as decimals. P-values, reported in parentheses, are
calculated with robust standard errors clustered at the industry level. *, **, and *** denote significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,respectively.
Model Model
1 2
Industry return in year t -1.58∗∗∗
(0.000)
Industry return in year t-1 -3.17∗∗∗
(0.000)
Manufacturing & Energy -1.00∗∗∗ -0.75∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.002)
High Tech 1.04∗∗∗ 1.41∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Health 0.12 0.10
(0.000) (0.000)
Finance -1.64∗∗∗ -1.14∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Utilities -1.14∗∗∗ -0.76∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Other -0.20 -0.12
(0.000) (0.001)
Year Dummies Yes Yes
N 14,818 14,818
pensation. In dollar values this corresponds to around $200,000 more risk-neutrally valued
pay for the median CEO, and to around $400,000 for CEOs receiving mean compensation.
Note that the hazard rate is highly significant even after controlling for firm size as mea-
sured by the log of market capitalization. This is an important result as it shows that our
estimates do not pick up spurious relations due to the correlation between turnover risk and
market values. Importantly, the relation holds when controlling for common year effects.
As the year dummies pick up the common variation of turnover risk and compensation over
time, this result indicates that there is an additional cross-sectional relation between the
two variables. We explore the time-series and cross-sectional relations separately below.
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Table 3.4: Distribution of predicted hazard rates. Hazard rates are estimated using the predicted
values of the Probit regressions in Table 3.3 and expressed in percent.
PANEL A: Model 1
Year Q5 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q95 Mean Q95-Q5
1993 0.63 1.04 1.58 1.74 2.60 1.46 1.97
1994 0.90 1.46 2.18 2.38 3.49 2.04 2.59
1995 0.95 1.54 2.28 2.49 3.64 2.16 2.70
1996 1.07 1.73 2.55 2.78 4.03 2.42 2.96
1997 1.43 2.26 3.28 3.74 5.09 3.17 3.66
1998 1.23 1.96 2.87 3.27 4.50 2.79 3.27
1999 1.38 2.19 3.46 3.63 4.95 3.18 3.57
2000 1.93 2.99 4.62 4.83 6.48 4.21 4.55
2001 0.68 1.13 1.87 1.97 2.79 1.71 2.10
All years 0.95 1.71 2.38 3.46 4.95 2.64 4.01
PANEL B: Model 2
Year Q5 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q95 Mean Q95-Q5
1993 0.32 0.97 1.19 1.95 3.04 1.47 2.72
1994 0.71 1.37 1.73 2.59 4.01 2.03 3.29
1995 0.84 1.50 2.07 2.88 3.63 2.16 2.79
1996 0.83 1.54 2.34 3.37 4.12 2.42 3.29
1997 1.00 1.91 2.97 4.02 5.90 3.17 4.91
1998 0.79 1.88 2.49 3.69 5.09 2.82 4.30
1999 1.78 2.40 3.21 3.67 4.71 3.15 2.93
2000 2.39 3.18 4.04 5.07 7.37 4.17 4.98
2001 0.42 0.81 1.18 2.41 5.23 1.74 4.81
All years 0.79 1.50 2.48 3.39 5.40 2.64 4.61
Columns (2) and (4) add corporate governance variables and CEO characteristics.
(The sample size is reduced because the IRRC data are available only starting in 1996.)
Chairman-CEOs earn nearly 20% more than non-chairman CEOs. Board size is negatively
related to CEO pay while the coefficient of the percentage of independent directors has a
positive sign.9 CEO age and tenure are not significantly related to compensation. Impor-
tantly, the result for the impact of the hazard rate remains strong and economically and
statistically significant even when controlling for these additional variables.
Time-series and cross-sectional relations. This subsection aims at disentangling the
time-series and cross-sectional elements of the turnover-compensation relation. We start
9One reason for the latter result may be that benchmarking to high pay levels is more prevalent in
corporations with a greater fraction of outside directors. Alternatively, independent boards set more high
powered incentives and, therefore, need to give CEOs greater risk-neutral compensation to satisfy their
participation constraint. This is consistent with the theoretical prediction of Hermalin (2005) that stronger
boards may, in fact, be associated with higher executive pay.
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Table 3.5: OLS regressions for log of total compensation. The table reports ordinary least squares
(OLS) regressions of log of total compensation on the hazard rate and control variables for S&P1500 CEOs
over the period 1993-2001. The hazard rate is estimated as the predicted value from the Probit regressions
in Table 3.3 using model 1 for regressions 1 and 2, and model 2 for regressions 3 and 4. Stock return,
stock return volatility, and the hazard rate are expressed in percent. Market value is computed as the
market value of equity plus the book value of debt. Volatility and log market value are measured in
t-1. Chairman is a dummy variable which equals one if the CEO is chairman of the board and zero
otherwise. Board size is the number of directors on the board. Independent directors is the percentage of
independent directors on the board, expressed in percent. Age and tenure are the CEO’s age and tenure,
respectively. The dependent variable, total compensation, includes salary, bonus, restricted stock granted
and the Black-Scholes value of option grants. It is truncated at the 1% level to reduce outlier problems.
Nominal values are converted to 2000 dollars using the consumer price index provided by the U.S. Bureau
of Labor Statistics. Observations with CEO ownership 10% are also excluded. P-values are calculated
with robust standard errors clustered at the CEO-firm level, and are reported in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and
∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Model 1 Model 2
Dependent Variable Ln(Total Comp) Ln(Total Comp) Ln(Total Comp) Ln(Total Comp)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Hazard rate 0.1238*** 0.1169*** 0.0919*** 0.0802***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Return in t 0.0017*** 0.0015*** 0.0018*** 0.0016***
(0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.003)
Return in t-1 0.0009*** 0.0009*** 0.0013*** 0.0012***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln(Market value) 0.4282*** 0.4467*** 0.4262*** 0.4466***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Volatility 0.0081*** 0.0084*** 0.0083*** 0.0086***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Chairman 0.1823*** 0.1785***
(0.000) (0.000)
Board size -0.0117* -0.0139**
(0.055) (0.023)
Indept. directors [%] 0.0016* 0.0015*
(0.065) (0.075)
Age -0.0019 -0.0017
(0.447) (0.484)
Tenure -0.0016 -0.0014
(0.571) (0.612)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 10205 5835 10205 5835
Adjusted R-squared 0.467 0.481 0.465 0.478
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by separating the time-series effects in a regression using CEO-firm fixed effects. In this
specification, identification depends only on time-series variation of the hazard rate for
a given CEO-firm combination. Notice that, as companies rarely change industry over
time, variation in the hazard rate of Model 1 comes from the within-industry time-series
variation of the hazard rate only, while Model 2 also generates variation due to changes in
industry performance. For this reason we do not use year dummies as additional controls,
because they would leave no or little additional co-variation between the hazard rate and
compensation.
Table 3.6 contains the results of the fixed effects regressions. The hazard rate enters
positively in all regressions and is always significant. Notice that the hazard rate coeffi-
cient is lower by about one half if the extended Probit specification is used to estimate
the hazard rate. One explanation for this finding is that in this case the hazard is by
construction negatively correlated with industry and hence total stock returns. This may
introduce a mechanical relation between the hazard rate and (the equity-based part of)
total compensation even if total stock returns are controlled for.
An important aspect of these results is that even with time-series identification only,
and even when controlling for market value, the hazard rate coefficient remains positive
and highly significant. Recall that market capitalization exhibits a similar non-monotonic
time-series pattern as the hazard rate and total compensation. The results of Table 3.6
thus show that market valuations cannot alone explain the time-series evolution of CEO
pay and that the hazard rate has additional explanatory power.
In order to isolate the pure cross-sectional component of the turnover effect, we estimate
cross-sectional regressions by averaging all annual observations of a CEO in a given firm.
The results shown in Table 3.7 corroborate our previous findings. The magnitude of the
coefficients relative to those obtained in the fixed effects regressions indicates that the
cross-sectional element is even more important in the overall relation between turnover
risk and compensation than the time-series element.
CEO tenure and the turnover premium. Our results so far have shown that CEOs
who are exogenously exposed to higher turnover risk also receive higher compensation,
irrespective of their tenure. If it is true that a turnover premium on compensation is the
result of explicit or implicit bargaining, then we would expect the results to be stronger at
times when pay is actually negotiated. This is obviously the case when the CEO is newly
hired while it is less clear in later years of the CEO’s tenure. Table 3.8 reports regression
results for the subsample of CEOs who are in the first year of their tenure. Table 3.9
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Table 3.6: Fixed effects regressions for log total compensation. The table reports CEO-firm
fixed effects regressions of log of total compensation on the hazard rate and control variables for S&P1500
CEOs over the period 1993-2001. The hazard rate is estimated as the predicted value from the Probit
regressions in Table 3.3 using model 1 for regressions 1 and 2, and model 2 for regressions 3 and 4. Stock
return, stock return volatility, and the hazard rate are expressed in percent. Market value is computed
as the market value of equity plus the book value of debt. Volatility and log market value are measured
in t-1. Chairman is a dummy variable which equals one if the CEO is chairman of the board and zero
otherwise. Board size is the number of directors on the board. Independent directors is the percentage of
independent directors on the board, expressed in percent. Age and tenure are the CEO’s age and tenure,
respectively. The dependent variable, total compensation, includes salary, bonus, restricted stock granted
and the Black-Scholes value of option grants. It is truncated at the 1% level to reduce outlier problems.
Nominal values are converted to 2000 dollars using the consumer price index provided by the U.S. Bureau
of Labor Statistics. Observations with CEO ownership 10% are also excluded. P-values are calculated
with robust standard errors clustered at the CEO-firm level, and are reported in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and
∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Model 1 Model 2
Dependent Variable Ln(Total Comp) Ln(Total Comp) Ln(Total Comp) Ln(Total Comp)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Hazard rate 0.0605*** 0.0366*** 0.0345*** 0.0151*
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.088)
Return in t 0.0016*** 0.0010* 0.0017*** 0.0010*
(0.001) (0.067) (0.001) (0.064)
Return in t-1 0.0008*** 0.0010*** 0.0010*** 0.0011***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln(Market value) 0.4824*** 0.2750*** 0.4934*** 0.2776***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Volatility 0.0027*** -0.0039* 0.0022** -0.0048**
(0.008) (0.076) (0.019) (0.025)
Chairman 0.0485 0.0461
(0.166) (0.191)
Board size 0.0034 0.0030
(0.641) (0.686)
Indept. directors [%] -0.0001 -0.0001
(0.949) (0.922)
Age -0.0503*** -0.0510***
(0.000) (0.000)
Tenure 0.1215*** 0.1233***
(0.000) (0.000)
CEO-Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 10205 5835 10205 5835
Adjusted R-squared 0.146 0.109 0.143 0.107
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Table 3.7: Cross-sectional regressions for log total compensation. The table reports cross-
sectional (between effects) regressions of log of total compensation on the hazard rate and control variables
for S&P1500 CEOs over the period 1993-2001. The hazard rate is estimated as the predicted value from
the Probit regressions in Table 3.3 using model 1 for regressions 1 and 2, and model 2 for regressions 3
and 4. Stock return, stock return volatility, and the hazard rate are expressed in percent. Market value is
computed as the market value of equity plus the book value of debt. Volatility and log market value are
measured in t-1. Chairman is a dummy variable which equals one if the CEO is chairman of the board
and zero otherwise. Board size is the number of directors on the board. Independent directors is the
percentage of independent directors on the board, expressed in percent. Age and tenure are the CEO’s age
and tenure, respectively. The dependent variable, total compensation, includes salary, bonus, restricted
stock granted and the Black-Scholes value of option grants. It is truncated at the 1% level to reduce outlier
problems. Nominal values are converted to 2000 dollars using the consumer price index provided by the
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Observations with CEO ownership 10% are also excluded. P-values are
calculated with robust standard errors clustered at the CEO-firm level, and are reported in parentheses.
∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Model 1 Model 2
Dependent Variable Ln(Total Comp) Ln(Total Comp) Ln(Total Comp) Ln(Total Comp)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Hazard rate 0.1139*** 0.1005*** 0.1027*** 0.0831***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Return in t 0.0021*** 0.0023*** 0.0021*** 0.0023***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Return in t-1 0.0005** 0.0006** 0.0008*** 0.0009***
(0.034) (0.045) (0.000) (0.003)
Ln(Market value) 0.4432*** 0.4540*** 0.4412*** 0.4517***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Volatility 0.0089*** 0.0082*** 0.0085*** 0.0078***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Chairman 0.1668*** 0.1628***
(0.000) (0.000)
Board size -0.0178** -0.0181**
(0.011) (0.010)
Indept. directors [%] 0.0017* 0.0018*
(0.067) (0.057)
Age -0.0051** -0.0047*
(0.037) (0.053)
Tenure -0.0022 -0.0023
(0.446) (0.422)
Observations 10205 5835 10205 5835
Adjusted R-squared 0.490 0.502 0.490 0.501
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contains the results for the complementary subsample of CEOs beyond their first year of
tenure. As expected, the turnover-compensation relation is much stronger for first year
CEOs than for more senior CEOs. The coefficient estimates of the hazard rate are about
twice as large for first year CEOs compared to more senior CEOs. For the median CEO this
corresponds to around $400,000 more in terms of total compensation for a one percentage
point increase in turnover risk, and around $800,000 more for the mean CEO.
Interestingly, Tables 3.8 and 3.9 also reveal that newly hired CEOs are not rewarded for
past performance, i.e. performance that can only be attributed to their predecessors. In
contrast, more senior CEOs are indeed rewarded for past performance. To our knowledge,
we are the first to document this fact.
Robustness. The results are robust to a large variety of alternative specifications and
subsamples. For space reasons, we only point out that the results continue to hold (1) if
we exclude financials and utilities, (2) if we include CEOs in the top and bottom percentile
of total compensation, (3) if we include additional corporate governance variables such as
the Gompers et al. (2003) governance index, the percentage of independent directors and
board size in the estimation of CEO hazard rates. If (4) we include CEOs with ownership
stakes above 10%, the hazard rate coefficients generally become less significant but remain
significant at the 5% level in all regressions except for those in Table 3.5, columns (1) and
(3), where they are borderline significant.
3.4.4 Causality
The argument that efficient executive compensation should rise in response to higher
turnover risk is intuitively appealing. In addition, the data also allow us to address explic-
itly a potential concern with our empirical results in the previous section, namely, that the
hazard rate coefficient may only in part reflect the causal effect of turnover risk on com-
pensation. At least two other explanations are conceivable. First, the positive correlation
between turnover risk and compensation may be driven by reverse causation. One may
argue that high CEO pay increases firing risk as it leads to higher performance expecta-
tions and accountability of CEOs. Second, there may be an omitted, possibly unobservable
factor driving both turnover risk and compensation. The primary candidate for this factor
could be a general tendency towards stronger incentives which may lead boards to grant
pay packages with higher proportions of equity-based pay, and, at the same time, to be
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Table 3.8: OLS regressions of log total compensation for first year CEOs. The table reports
ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of log of total compensation on the hazard rate and control
variables for S&P1500 CEOs in the first year of their tenure. The sample period is 1993-2001. The
hazard rate is estimated as the predicted value from the Probit regressions in Table 3.3 using model 1 for
regressions 1 and 2, and model 2 for regressions 3 and 4. Stock return, stock return volatility, and the
hazard rate are expressed in percent. Market value is computed as the market value of equity plus the
book value of debt. Volatility and log market value are measured in t-1. Chairman is a dummy variable
which equals one if the CEO is chairman of the board and zero otherwise. Board size is the number of
directors on the board. Independent directors is the percentage of independent directors on the board,
expressed in percent. Age and tenure are the CEO’s age and tenure, respectively. The dependent variable,
total compensation, includes salary, bonus, restricted stock granted and the Black-Scholes value of option
grants. It is truncated at the 1% level to reduce outlier problems. Nominal values are converted to 2000
dollars using the consumer price index provided by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Observations with
CEO ownership 10% are also excluded. P-values are calculated with robust standard errors clustered at
the CEO-firm level, and are reported in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% level, respectively.
Model 1 Model 2
Dependent Variable Ln(Total Comp) Ln(Total Comp) Ln(Total Comp) Ln(Total Comp)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Hazard rate 0.2293*** 0.2273*** 0.1720*** 0.1578***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Return in t 0.0015*** 0.0013** 0.0018*** 0.0015**
(0.000) (0.027) (0.000) (0.010)
Return in t-1 -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0001 -0.0001
(0.173) (0.297) (0.938) (0.954)
Ln(Market value) 0.4660*** 0.5002*** 0.4594*** 0.4931***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Volatility 0.0084*** 0.0078*** 0.0089*** 0.0089***
(0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.001)
Chairman 0.0413 0.0266
(0.583) (0.727)
Board size -0.0277** -0.0288**
(0.047) (0.039)
Indept. directors [%] 0.0059*** 0.0060***
(0.004) (0.003)
Age -0.0131*** -0.0122**
(0.009) (0.019)
Observations 1075 699 1075 699
Adjusted R-squared 0.472 0.485 0.466 0.473
more willing to fire CEOs.10 As more incentive compensation is associated with higher ex-
10Note that the fact that monetary incentives and turnover as an incentive device can be substitutes is
perfectly compatible with the notion that as boards wish to implement stronger incentives overall, they
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Table 3.9: OLS regressions of log total compensation for CEOs beyond the first year of their
tenure. The table reports ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of log of total compensation on the
hazard rate and control variables for S&P1500 CEOs beyond the first year of their tenure. The sample
period is 1993-2001. The hazard rate is estimated as the predicted value from the Probit regressions
in Table 3.3 using model 1 for regressions 1 and 2, and model 2 for regressions 3 and 4. Stock return,
stock return volatility, and the hazard rate are expressed in percent. Market value is computed as the
market value of equity plus the book value of debt. Volatility and log market value are measured in
t-1. Chairman is a dummy variable which equals one if the CEO is chairman of the board and zero
otherwise. Board size is the number of directors on the board. Independent directors is the percentage of
independent directors on the board, expressed in percent. Age and tenure are the CEO’s age and tenure,
respectively. The dependent variable, total compensation, includes salary, bonus, restricted stock granted
and the Black-Scholes value of option grants. It is truncated at the 1% level to reduce outlier problems.
Nominal values are converted to 2000 dollars using the consumer price index provided by the U.S. Bureau
of Labor Statistics. Observations with CEO ownership 10% are also excluded. P-values are calculated
with robust standard errors clustered at the CEO-firm level, and are reported in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and
∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Model 1 Model 2
Dependent Variable Ln(Total Comp) Ln(Total Comp) Ln(Total Comp) Ln(Total Comp)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Hazard rate 0.1127*** 0.1018*** 0.0826*** 0.0733***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Return in t 0.0017*** 0.0015*** 0.0018*** 0.0016***
(0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (0.005)
Return in t-1 0.0011*** 0.0011*** 0.0014*** 0.0014***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln(Market value) 0.4242*** 0.4427*** 0.4224*** 0.4428***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Volatility 0.0079*** 0.0082*** 0.0081*** 0.0083***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Chairman 0.2186*** 0.2181***
(0.000) (0.000)
Board size -0.0136** -0.0157**
(0.024) (0.010)
Indept. directors [%] 0.0012 0.0011
(0.175) (0.197)
Age -0.0024 -0.0021
(0.291) (0.349)
Observations 9130 5584 9130 5584
Adjusted R-squared 0.469 0.483 0.466 0.481
pected values of pay, this mechanism may cause turnover risk and levels of compensation
to be correlated.
make more use of both tools.
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In this section we address both of these alternative interpretations. The key idea of our
approach to investigate the causality issue is that the cause must occur before the effect.
The methodology thus relies on the time-series pattern of turnover and compensation.11
In particular, we consider two sets of arguments. First, if higher compensation increases
turnover risk, we would expect that compensation is particularly high before a forced
turnover. Conversely, if it is true that turnover risk causally affects compensation through
a turnover risk premium, we would expect that compensation increases following a forced
turnover as agents will revise their perception of turnover risk upward when forced turnover
occurs. Second, if forced turnover and higher compensation are both a consequence of a
trend towards stronger incentives, we would expect the fraction of equity-based pay to
increase hand in hand with total compensation in firms where forced turnover occurs.
This is because a risk-averse CEO would get higher expected levels of pay when the power
of incentives increases. Conversely, if equity-based pay is lower after forced turnover, but
we still observe higher total compensation, this rules out the explanation that a general
trend toward stronger incentives affects compensation and turnover risk simultaneously.
We first investigate the potential reverse causality in the turnover risk - compensation
relation. We use voluntary turnovers as a benchmark and compare the evolution of CEO
compensation around turnovers of the two distinct types. To do this, we use the following
regression model:
Yit =
T∑
τ=−T
piFτ Fiτ +
T∑
τ=−T
piVτ Viτ + β
′Xit + ²it (3.16)
The dependent variable Y is the log of total CEO compensation. The indices i and t
reference the firm and the fiscal year, respectively. The index τ denotes the year relative
to the year of turnover. More precisely, τ is normalized such that τ = 0 is the last fiscal
year the incumbent CEO is in office, so that τ < 0 indicates the −τ th year before turnover
and τ > 0 indicates the τ th year after turnover. Xit is a vector of control variables.
The key variables are the Fiτ and Viτ indicator variables. Fiτ equals one if forced
turnover occurs in firm i at −τ years from the current year t, and zero otherwise. Viτ is
defined analogously for firms in which turnover occurs voluntarily.
The vectors piFτ and pi
V
τ are the parameters of interest in this equation. They measure
11In drawing conclusions about causality from the time-series relation of variables, our method is closely
related to the concept of Granger causality. A variable Xt is said to ”Granger cause” the variable Yt+1 if
(a) Xt occurs before Yt+1; and (b) it contains information useful in forecasting Yt+1 that is not found in
a group of other appropriate variables.
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the period-specific means of total compensation in firms where CEO turnover is forced
and voluntary, respectively, conditional on all covariates. By including a pair of indicator
variables, (piFτ , pi
V
τ ), for each period, the relation between turnover type and compensation
is allowed to vary with τ . The coefficient difference piFτ − piVτ can be interpreted as the
percentage point difference in CEO compensation between firms where turnover is forced
and firms where turnover is voluntary, for a given period τ , and controlling for other
determinants of CEO pay. For example, a coefficient difference piF−3 − piV−3 = .05 means
that three years before the turnover, CEOs who are dismissed earn 5 percentage points
more than CEOs that depart voluntarily. The time series of the coefficient differences
piFτ − piVτ around turnover potentially allows us to detect causal effects of forced departure
on compensation. If these differences were significantly positive before turnover, reverse
causality would indeed be a concern.
Figure 3.7 illustrates the results. The solid lines plot the point estimates of the co-
efficient differences, piFτ − piVτ , by period, as obtained from equation (3.16). The dashed
lines indicate 90% confidence intervals around zero (they are curved because of the vary-
ing number of observations at different time horizons). (The detailed regression results
including significance tests for the differences of coefficients are given in Table 3.12 which
is relegated to the appendix.) Panel A displays the regression estimates using the basic
set of firm-specific control variables we also used in the hazard rate regressions. Panel B
shows the results when corporate governance variables are added as controls. Recall that
in the regressions of the previous section hazard rates are determined entirely by year and
industry. Here, by contrast, we use the actual occurrence of turnover as a proxy for the
increased perception of turnover risk and control for industry and year effects. Hence, the
results of the two regression approaches can be seen as complementary since turnover risk
is driven by distinct sources.
The two panels of Figure 3.7 suggest that in the years preceding turnover, CEO com-
pensation does not differ systematically between firms that experience forced and voluntary
turnovers. The point estimates for the pre-turnover period are both positive and negative
and, with two exceptions, lie well within the confidence bounds. In contrast, in the years
following turnover, CEO compensation appears to be significantly higher in firms experi-
encing forced turnovers relative to their otherwise similar counterparts. All point estimates
are positive and many lie above the upper confidence bound.
To confirm this result statistically, we define a coarser set of indicator variables, Fi−,
Vi−, Fi+, Vi+, where the subscripts ”-” and ”+” indicate the entire pre- and post-turnover
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Figure 3.7: Percentage difference in total compensation. The figure shows the percentage differ-
ence in total compensation between CEOs in firms where turnover is forced and firms where turnover is
voluntary. The solid line plots the point estimates of the coefficient differences piFτ − piVτ by period. The
dashed lines represent 90% confidence intervals of a two-sided Wald test that the coeffiient differences are
equal to zero. Year zero refers to the last fiscal year the incumbent CEO is in office.
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period, respectively. Then we run the same regressions as before but replace the period-
specific indicators by the pre- and post turnover indicators. Columns (1) and (2) of Table
3.10 show the results. As expected, CEO compensation does not differ significantly by
departure type in the pre-turnover period. In the post-turnover period, however, CEOs
following dismissed predecessors earn between 11 and 15 percentage points more than CEOs
who replace voluntarily departed CEOs. The difference-in-differences tests reported below
the simple difference tests further underscore that forced turnover brings about a significant
shift in CEO pay relative to voluntary departures. The occurrence of forced turnover shifts
CEO compensation in these firms upward by 13 to 19 percentage points relative to firms
where the CEO departed voluntarily. This clearly rejects the reverse causation hypothesis
and provides additional support for the executive turnover risk premium.
Table 3.10: Event time regressions of log total compensation. The table displays the results of
event time regressions according to equation (3.16) for S&P1500 CEOs over the period 1993-2001. piF−, pi
V
− ,
piF+ , piV+ are dummy variables indicating the pre- and post-turnover periods and whether CEO turnover
was forced or voluntary. Subscript ”-” indicates the pre-turnover period while subscript ”+” indicates
the post-turnover period. Superscript ”F” indicates that turnover in period zero was forced, superscript
”V” indicates the complementary case of voluntary turnover. P-values of differences in coefficients are
calculated from Wald statistics using standard errors clustered at the firm level. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Dependent Variable Ln(Total comp) % Equity-based pay
(1) (2) (3) (4)
piF− − piV− 0.0193 -0.0731 0.0428*** 0.0058
(0.634) (0.187) (0.002) (0.776)
piF+ − piV+ 0.1499*** 0.1119*** 0.0019 -0.0091
(0.000) (0.008) (0.897) (0.578)
(piF+ − piV+)− (piF− − piV−) 0.1305*** 0.1850*** -0.0409** -0.0149
(0.008) (0.003) (0.026) (0.528)
Firm-specific controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Corporate governance controls No Yes No Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8816 5264 8954 5343
Adjusted R-squared 0.54 0.54 0.21 0.20
We now turn to the question of whether the pattern of CEO compensation revealed in
Figure 3.7 could be the result of differential trends towards incentive provision across firms.
If this were the case we would expect incentive compensation, total compensation and
turnover to be correlated. In our empirical setup this would suggest that the trend toward
higher total compensation in firms where forced turnover occurs should be accompanied
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by a trend towards more incentive compensation.
To test this hypothesis we re-run the regressions according to equation (3.16) both with
period-specific and pre- and post-turnover indicators, but replace the dependent variable
with the fraction of equity-based pay in total compensation. Figure 3.8 shows the point
estimates of the coefficient differences piFτ − piVτ by period and the respective confidence
intervals. Contrary to the incentive hypothesis, the proportion of equity-based pay does
not systematically increase after forced turnover. This is confirmed by the regression results
which use the coarse definition for the indicator variables shown in columns (3) and (4)
of Table 3.10. If anything, we observe a decrease rather than an increase of equity-based
incentives in firms where forced turnover occurs. This would be consistent with incentive
substitution rather than a trend towards stronger performance sensitivity of both pay and
turnover. Holding turnover risk constant, we would expect total compensation to decrease
as CEOs are exposed to lower stock price risk. Therefore, a rise in CEO pay can only be
explained by other factors, such as a turnover risk premium.
Taken together these results strongly support the notion that turnover risk has a causal
effect on CEO compensation. The occurrence of forced turnover raises total compensation
by about 11 to 15 percentage points, an effect that cannot be explained by a trend towards
higher performance sensitivity of both CEO compensation and turnover. One limitation of
the regression approach used in this section is that it does not allow us to quantify exactly
how turnover risk is compensated with higher pay levels. If forced turnover occurs, the
perception of turnover risk arguably rises, but we have no means of estimating exactly by
how much.
3.5 Conclusion
This paper quantifies the price of exogenous turnover risk in executive compensation. Our
empirical analysis suggests that for the median CEO from the S&P 1500 sample, a one per-
centage point increase in turnover risk is associated with an increase in total compensation
of more than $200,000, a large amount. In interpreting this number, we are able to rule
out reverse causation: Compensation levels before forced turnover are not different from
compensation levels before voluntary turnover. We are also able to rule out the idea that
the turnover risk premium is simply a consequence of stronger incentives overall: Equity-
based compensation after forced turnover is used to the same extent as after voluntary
turnover.
96 CHAPTER 3. THE EXECUTIVE TURNOVER RISK PREMIUM
−8 −7 −6 −5 −4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
−20
−15
−10
−5
0
5
10
15
20
Panel A: Regression with basic controls
Year relative to turnover
D
iff
e
re
n
ce
 in
 %
 e
q
u
ity
−
b
a
se
d
 p
a
y
−8 −7 −6 −5 −4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
−20
−15
−10
−5
0
5
10
15
20
Year relative to turnover
D
iff
e
re
n
ce
 in
 %
 e
q
u
ity
−
b
a
se
d
 p
a
y
Panel B: Regression with full set of controls
Figure 3.8: Difference in percentage of equity-based compensation. The figure shows the differ-
ence in the percentage of equity-based CEO compensation between CEOs in firms where turnover is forced
and firms where turnover is voluntary. The solid line plots the point estimates of the coefficent differences
piFτ − piVτ by period. The dashed lines represent 90% confidence intervals of a two-sided Wald test that the
coeffiient differences are equal to zero. Year zero refers to the last fiscal year the incumbent CEO is in
office.
3.A. VALUING VULNERABLE EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 97
The turnover risk premium is likely due to a number of factors. First, unvested equity-
based compensation may be subject to forfeiture in case of forced turnover. Second, con-
cerns about reduced earnings opportunities following dismission are likely to be substantial.
Other factors may also play a role, however. These include, for example, personal, psy-
chological costs. Yet another possible explanation draws on evidence from behavioral eco-
nomics. Even though the historical average probability of forced turnover is small (2.53%
over 1993-2001), CEOs may overestimate these probabilities as they represent an extreme
event. Thus, probability weighting as proposed in cumulative prospect theory Kahneman
and Tversky (1992) may lead executives to perceive turnover risk as much higher than it
actually is, hence overstating the expected losses. Indeed, the difference between the empir-
ical turnover risk premium and the discount to executive compensation when accounting
for the mere monetary consequences of forced turnover gives an approximation of these
costs. Further disentangling the various sources of the empirical premium for exogenous
turnover risk is an interesting avenue for future research.
Appendix 3.A Valuing vulnerable executive compen-
sation
In this section we develop a model of the certainty equivalent compensation accounting
for the risk of forfeiture in case of turnover. We focus on forced turnover as the CEO’s
compensation packages typically do not lose value in other cases of turnover. In the cases
of change-in-control and regular retirement CEOs typically retain their unvested compen-
sation packages, while in the case of a job change the new employer usually compensates
the CEO for forfeited pay packages of his former employer.
In modeling the valuation effects of forced turnover, we follow the standard provisions
stipulated in public U.S. corporations’ incentive compensation plans which require the
cancelation of unvested stocks and options in case of executive turnover. For vested options,
we assume, again consistent with standard provisions, immediate exercise at the time of
turnover.
We define three dates which are known at the time the option or stock grant is made:
the vesting date, TV , the maturity date of the option grant, T , and the regular retirement
date of the CEO, TR, which we set to 65. Forced turnover can occur between the grant
date and the date of retirement. It will, however, only have a value-decreasing effect on the
executive’s option grant if it also occurs before expiry of the option. Thus forced turnover is
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value-decreasing on the interval [0, T ∧TR) only, where ∧ denotes ”the smaller of.” One can
think of the case when the CEO’s regular retirement date is before the option’s maturity
date, TR < T , as the case of an ”senior CEO” and the case when TR ≥ T as that of a
”junior CEO.”
We define the random time TF as the time the CEO is forced out of office. We assume
a constant hazard rate of forced turnover with density function fTF :
12
fTF (t) = λe
−λt t ∈ [0,∞), (3.17)
where λ is the hazard rate. We consider the payoffs from option and stock grants
separately. First, consider the option grant.13 We use the following notation: 1TF<TV ∧TR is
an indicator variable that is equal to 1 if the condition in the subscript holds. For example,
in this case the variable is 1 if the CEO is forced out at a date before his options are vested
and before he retires. The CEO’s wealth at time T from the option grant is then given by
WOT = 1TF<TV ∧TR · 0 + 1TF≥TV ∧TR1TF<TR∧T · n[PTF −X]+er(T−TF ) + 1TF≥TR∧T · n[PT −X]+
= 1TF≥TV ∧TR1TF<TR∧T · n[PTF −X]+er(T−TF ) + 1TF≥TR∧T · n[PT −X]+ (3.18)
where PTF and PT are the stock prices at TF and T , respectively, n is the number
of options in the grant, X is the strike price, and r is the risk-free rate. The first term
indicates the event that the CEO is fired before the options vest and before he retires in
which case the payoff is zero. The second term indicates the event that the CEO is fired
between the vesting date and the smaller of his retirement and the option’s expiry date.
This is the case of accelerated exercise in which the payoff of a single option is [PTF −X]+,
12One can, in principle, accommodate the feature that the probability of forced turnover, conditional
on survival, depends on factors such as time, industry performance, and firm performance by specifying
the hazard rate as a function of a set of these variables. In the empirical section, we use time- and
industry-specific hazard rates.
13We consider European options in our main analysis. This assumption is restrictive and does not,
in particular, allow for the empirically documented early exercise of executive stock options (except for
involuntary exercise of vested options in the event of turnover). By doing so, we retain tractability and
intuition of the model relative to American option valuation which necessarily relies on simulation (see
Carpenter (1998), Carpenter (2000) and Ingersoll (2006) for an analysis of subjective values of American
style options). In any case, the differential effect of turnover/cancelation on European and American
option values is likely to be negligible as cancelation occurs in the vesting period when the option cannot
be exercised anyway.
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the intrinsic value at departure. We assume that the CEO receives this payoff in cash
and invests it in the risk-free asset until T . The third term represents the case when the
CEO remains in office until regular retirement or option maturity. In this case he gets the
intrinsic value of the option at time T .
Analogously, the CEO’s payoff from his restricted stock grant is given by
W ST = 1TF<TV ∧TR · 0 + 1TF≥TV ∧TR1TF<TR∧T · sPTF er(T−TF ) + 1TF≥TR∧T · sPT
= 1TF≥TV ∧TR1TF<TR∧T · sPTF er(T−TF ) + 1TF≥TR∧T · sPT (3.19)
where the first term refers to the event that the CEO is dismissed before vesting and
retirement, in which case the payoff is zero, and the second term indicates the complemen-
tary event, in which case the CEO gets the full value of his stock grant at TF . As with the
option payoff at TF , we again assume that the stock is sold and the proceeds are invested
in the risk-free asset.
Assuming that the CEO has outside wealth W0 invested at the risk-free rate, r, his
total wealth at time T is
WT = W0e
rT +WOT +W
S
T (3.20)
If instead of the risky, equity-based compensation the CEO were awarded the amount
C in riskless cash, his wealth at time T is given by
WCT = (W0 + C)e
rT (3.21)
The certainty equivalent value of the CEO’s entire package of equity-based compensa-
tion is defined as the amount C∗ that equates expected utilities of equations (3.20) and
(3.21).
As opposed to the basic model without turnover which contains only one source of
uncertainty, the stock price at the maturity date, PT , we now have to account for a sec-
ond source of uncertainty, the time of forced turnover, TF . Because of the possibility of
accelerated exercise, expected utility then becomes a function of three random variables,
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TF , PTF , and PT . We have
E[U(WT (TF , PTF , PT ))]
= E
[
E[U(WT (PTF , PT ))|TF ]
]
= E
[ ∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
U(WT (PTF , PT ))fPT |PTF (PT )fPTF |TF (PTF )dPTdPTF
]
=
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
U(WT (PTF , PT ))fPT |PTF (PT )fPTF |TF (PTF )fTF (TF )dPTdPTF dTF
where the first three steps on the right hand side are obtained applying the law of iterated
expectation. Further evaluating this expression yields
E[U(WT (TF , PTF , PT ))]
= P [TF < TV ∧ TR] · U(W0erT )
+
∫ T∧TR
TV ∧TR
∫ ∞
0
U(WT (PTF ))fPTF |TF (PTF )fTF (TF )dPTF dTF
+ P [TF > T ∧ TR] ·
∫ ∞
0
U(n[PT −X]+ + sPT +W0erT )fPT (PT )dPT
= (1− e−λ(TV ∧TR)) · U(W0erT )
+
∫ T∧TR
TV ∧TR
∫ ∞
0
U(WT (PTF ))fPTF |TF (PTF )fTF (TF )dPTF dTF
+ e−λ(T∧TR) ·
∫ ∞
0
U(n[PT −X]+ + sPT +W0erT )fPT (PT )dPT
where steps four and five are simplifications obtained by splitting the integral over TF in
three parts. For the first part, 0 < TF < TV ∧ TR, expected utility is independent of the
stock price. For the second part, TV ∧ TR ≤ TF < T ∧ TR, expected utility depends on
the stock price at departure, PTF , but not on PT . For the third interval, TF ≥ T ∧ TR,
expected utility depends on the stock price at T , PT , but not on PTF .
We further assume that the CEO has a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility
function of the form U(WT ) = 1/(1 − ρ)W 1−ρT , where ρ is the coefficient of risk aversion.
The certainty equivalent, C∗, then has to be computed numerically.
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Appendix 3.B Valuing risk-adjusted compensation pack-
ages
Our calculations of certainty equivalent values of full CEO compensation packages without
forfeiture risk follow the methodology of Hall and Murphy (2002). For details see the
original paper. We outline here the extended methodology applying to the valuation which
accounts for forfeiture risk. Calculations are based on the following data:
s0 number of shares owned excluding the current year grant
s1 number of restricted shares granted in the current year
n0 number of stock options owned excluding the current year grant
n1 number of stock options granted in the current year
X0 average exercise price of previously granted options
X1 vector of exercise prices of current year options
Salary base salary plus all non-deferred compensation except bonus
Bonus bonus plus payouts from long-term incentive plans
T option term or term of the largest grant (in case of multiple grants)
TV vesting period (assumed to be 2.5 years)
TR years to regular retirement = max(0, 65 - age)
σ annualized volatility of monthly continuous returns, calculated over 48 months
β equity beta, calculated from monthly stock returns relative to the value-
weighted CRSP index over 48 months
rf yield of 1-year U.S. Treasury Bills
(rm − rf ) equity premium (assumed to be 6.5%)
ρ coefficient of relative risk aversion (assumed to be 2 or 3)
W0 non-firm-related safe wealth (assumed to be the greater of $5 million and four
times risk-neutral total compensation)
fO number of previously granted, exercisable options divided by the total number
of previously granted options
fS number of previously granted, vested stocks divided by the total number
of previously granted stocks
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Following Hall and Murphy (2002), we discount bonuses by 20% to account for the fact
that bonuses are often paid out partially in company stock rather than in cash and thus
are risky.
In order to account for previously granted stocks and options, we need to extend equa-
tions (3.20) and (3.21) for prior equity-based pay in the CEO’s portfolio. We call the
terminal wealth due to previously granted options W
O
T , and terminal wealth due to pre-
viously granted stock W
S
T . We also have to make assumptions regarding the remaining
vesting period of previous equity-based pay. This data is not available in ExecuComp.
ExecuComp does provide, however, the number of unvested stocks and options. We as-
sume that unvested stocks and options vest gradually over [0, TV − 1] , i.e. we assume that
the latest vesting date of previous equity-based pay is one year before the vesting date of
current compensation. Accounting for the fact that unvested previous compensation can
be forfeited we have
W
O
T = 1TF<TV −1 · (fO + (1− fO)
TF
TV − 1) · n0[PTF −X0]
+er(T−TF )
+ 1TF≥TV −11TF<T · n0[PTF −X0]+er(T−TF ) + 1TF≥T [PT −X0]+ (3.22)
and
W
S
T = 1TF<TV −1 · (fS + (1− fS)
TF
TV − 1) · s0PTF e
r(T−TF )
+ 1TF≥TV −11TF<T · s0PTF er(T−TF ) + 1TF≥TPT (3.23)
where fS and fO are the fractions of vested previous stocks and options. The equivalent
of equation (3.4) with risky current compensation then becomes
WT = (W0 + Salary + 0.8Bonus)e
rT +WOT +W
O
T +W
S
T +W
S
T (3.24)
and the equivalent of equation (3.5), where risky current compensation is replaced by the
safe cash amount C, is given by
WCT = (W0 + C)e
rT +W
O
T +W
S
T (3.25)
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The certainty equivalent C∗ is that amount of C which equates expected utilities of equa-
tions (3.24) and (3.25):
E[U(WT (TF , PTF , PT ))] ≡ E[U(WCT (TF , PTF , PT ))] (3.26)
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Appendix 3.C Tables
Table 3.12: Event time regressions of log total compensation. The table displays the results of
event time regressions according to equation (3.16) for S&P1500 CEOs over the period 1993-2001. piFτ and
piVτ are dummy variables indicating the period relative to the year of turnover and whether CEO turnover
was forced or voluntary. The subscript indicates the period relative to the turnover year. The superscript
”F” indicates that turnover in period zero was forced, superscript ”V” indicates the complementary case
of voluntary turnover. P-values of differences in coefficients are calculated from Wald statistics using
standard errors clustered at the firm level. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively. The point estimates of the coefficient differences are plotted in Figure 3.7.
(1) (2)
Dependent Variable Ln(Total Comp) Ln(Total Comp)
∆piτ P-value ∆piτ P-value
piF−8 − piV−8 -0.0851 (0.758)
piF−7 − piV−7 -0.1258 (0.301)
piF−6 − piV−6 0.1542 (0.107)
piF−5 − piV−5 0.1509** (0.047) 0.0176 (0.935)
piF−4 − piV−4 -0.0294 (0.671) -0.1617 (0.189)
piF−3 − piV−3 0.0535 (0.382) -0.0390 (0.667)
piF−2 − piV−2 0.0227 (0.666) -0.0166 (0.823)
piF−1 − piV−1 -0.0381 (0.479) -0.0963 (0.194)
piF0 − piV0 -0.0356 (0.616) -0.0887 (0.311)
piF1 − piV1 0.1556*** (0.007) 0.0549 (0.440)
piF2 − piV2 0.0697 (0.219) 0.0278 (0.691)
piF3 − piV3 0.2336*** (0.001) 0.2023*** (0.005)
piF4 − piV4 0.1862** (0.020) 0.2054** (0.014)
piF5 − piV5 0.1020 (0.253) 0.1180 (0.222)
piF6 − piV6 0.0803 (0.435) 0.0097 (0.921)
piF7 − piV7 0.2516* (0.097) 0.2786* (0.083)
piF8 − piV8 0.2376 (0.228) 0.2005 (0.349)
Firm-specific controls Yes Yes
Corporate governance controls No Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 8828 5273
Adjusted R-squared 0.99 0.99
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